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Prolegomena to a Study of the Ethical 
Ideal of Plutarch and of 
the Greeks of the 
First Century A. D. 


A Thesis Presented in Partial Fulfillment of the Requtre- 
ments for the Degree of Ph. D., at the 
University of Michigan 


By 


GEORGE DEPUE HADZSITS. 


1906 
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI PRESS 
CINCINNATI, OHIO. 


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Ψ“ψων 
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Ψψωυυ νυν 
ve 
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CONTENTS. 


2 wus 
3 fu) We) ais δ... 3 i 
She Oe eee ὴ SE he 
πον a O Petes Cinta 157 
Sa at ahs aie th 
ay | 
Siivemie® Yorke bees, > 
ey ics ἀν Ate 4 arg ® > 39 ͵ 
ve are Re 15.0.91. 522 >>? 
e723 0022? NA Te ASP ae Leah ἐὰν 
are 
ae I 
wala | 
; f 3 
Bien ie 
sa “tcl ἡ ti i | 
ἡ , i, Mi 
᾿ ἥ ἣ ΔΖ. 
if 
Ἷ { ᾿ : 
᾿ ἰ aut 
fi AA | ; 
Ἢ : ΩΝ ᾿ | 
᾿ " ¥ ᾿ 


" 


ἈΚ ΡΝ 
PONT EPR: 


BIBLIOGRAPHY. 


Arnold, W. T. 


Bergk, Theo. 
Benn, A. W. 


Bernays, J. 
Christ, W. 
Croiset, A. et M. 
Droysen, J. G. 
EKichhoff, A. 


Friedlaender, L. 
Finlay, Geo. 
Frazer, J. G. 
Gardthausen, V. 
Gregorovius, Ferd. 
Gréard, Octave. 
Gomperz, Th. 
Holm, A. 
Hertzberg, G. Fr. 
Hatch, Edwin. 
Heinze, H. 
Holden, H. A. 
Hoffding, H. 
Karst, J. 

K6stlin, K. 
Kennedy, H. A. A. 


Marquardt, J. und / 


Mommsen, ΤῊ. } 


The Roman System of Provincial Ad- 
ministration. | 

Griechische Litteraturgeschichte. 

The Philosophy of Greece, considered in 
relation to the character and history of 
ils people. 

WH AC fii σι Se OZ» 

Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur. 

Histoire de la Littérature Grecque. 

Geschichte des Hellenismus. 

Ueber die religtése sittliche Weltansicht des 
Plutarchus. 

Sittengeschichte. 

Greece under the Romans. 

Edition of Pausantas. 

Augustus u. seine Zeit. 

The Emperor Hadrian. 

De la Morale de Plutarque. 

Griechische Denker. 

The History of Greece. 


Geschichte Griechenlands. 


Essays on Biblical Greek. 
Plutarchische Untersuchungen. 
Plutarch’s Lives. 

Ethtk. 

Geschichte des hellenistischen Zeitalters. 
Geschichte der Ethtk. 

Sources of New Testament Greek. 


Handbuch der Rémischen Alterttimer, 
Vols. 4 and 6. 


ἵν) 


Merivale, Chas. 


Mommsen, Th. 
Miller, Iwan. 
Miiller, F. Max. 
Mahaffy, J. P. 


Martha, C. 
Niese, B. 


Norden, Ed. 
Oakesmith, Jno. 
Paulsen, Fr. 
Roberts, W. Rhys. 
Schmidt, L. 
Shuckburgh, Εἰ. 5. 
Sickinger, A. 


Trench, R. C. 
Thumb, A. 


Volkmann, R. 


Wundt, W. 
Windelband, W. 
Weissenberger, B. 


Wenley, R. M. 


Wedgwood, J. 
Wundt, Wm. 
Whitney, W. D. 
Wunderer, C. 
Ziegler, Th. 
Zeller, Edw. 


The History of the Romans under the 
Empire. 

The Provinces of the Roman Eembptre. 

Handbuch, Vol. 3. 

Lectures on the Science of Language. 

Problems in Greek History. The Greek 
World under Roman Sway. 

Etudes Morales sur L Antiguité. 

Geschichte der Griechischen u. Makedon- 
wschen Staaten sett der Schlacht bei 
Chaeronea. 

Die Antike Kunstprose. 

The Religion of Plutarch. 

System der thik. 

The Ancient Bocotians. 

Die Ethitk der alten Griechen. 

Augustus. | 

De Linguae Latinae apud Plutarchum et 
Religuirs et Vestigzis. 

Plutarch: His Life, His Parallel Lives 
ane flis Morals. 

Synonyms of the New Testament. , 

Handbuch der Neugriechischen Volks- 
sprache. Die Griechische Sprache tm 
Zeitalter des Hellenismus. 

Leben, Schriften wu. Philosophie des 
Plutarch. 

Ethics (Engl. Translation). 

A Fiistory of Ancient Philosophy. 

Die Sprache Piutarchs u. die Pseudopliut- 

_ archischen Schriften. 

Plutarch and his Age; in **The New 
World”, June, rQ00. 

The Moral Ideal. 

Vélkerpsychologie. 

Language and the Study of Language. 

Citate u. gefltigelte Worte bet Polybius. 

Geschichte der Ethtk. 

Dre Philosophte der Griechen. 


6 


LEXICA AND INDICES. 


(Note: We have taken all of our words through all of 
the following indices and lexica; supplementing this with 
wide reading, we have gathered the passages in which the 
terms are found. ‘The discussion deals with each term sepa- 
rately, giving an historical treatment of the significance, 
meaning and development of each term. ‘This work, it need 
hardly be added, does not lay claim to finality.) 


Index Homericus—Aug. Gehring. ‘Teubner, 1891. Appen- 
dix Hymnorum Vocabula Continens, 1895. 


Lexicon Homericum—H. Ebeling. /Teubner, 1885. 


Poetae Minores Graeci—Th. Gaisford. ‘Teubner, 1823. In- 
dices for Hesiod, Theognis, Archilochus, Solon, Simon- 
ides, Mimnermus, Tyrtaeus, Theocritus, Bion, Moschus. 


Hesiod—F. A. Paley. London, Geo Bell, 1861. 


Greek Lyric Poets—G. 85. Farnell. London, Longmans, 
Green & Co., 1891. 


Greek Melic Poets—H. W. Smyth. Macmillan ἃ Co., 1900. 


Bacchylides—F. G. Keyon. Oxford, 1897. 
Fr. W. Blass. ‘Teubner, 1898. 


Lexicon Pindaricum—I. Rumpel. ‘Teubner, 1883. 


Tragicae Dictionts Index spectans ad Tragicorum Graecorum 
Fragmenta—A. Nauck. Lipsiae, 1892. 


Lexicon Aeschyleum—J. Dindorf. Lipsiae, 1876. 
Lexicon Sophocleum—F¥r. Ellendt. Berlin, 1872. 


Euripidis Opera Omnia—A. et J. M. Duncan. Glasguae, 1821. 
Vol. 9. Index Verborum....QOmnium. Chr. D. Beck. 


7 


Concordance to the Comedies and Fragments of Aristophanes 
—H. Dunbar. Oxford, 1883. 


Menandri et Philemonis Reliquiae—Aug. Meineke. Berlin, 
1823. 


Herodotus—J. C. F. Baehr. Lipsiae, 1861. 


Lexicon to Herodotus—(Schweighaeuser.) H. Carey. Ox- 
ford, 1843. 


Thucydides—Fr. Goeller. London, 1835. 
K. W. Krtiger. Berlin, 1846. 


Lexicon Xenophonteum—F. G. Sturzius. Lipsiae, 1801-4. 


Indices Graecitatis guos in singulos oratores Atticos confecit— 
J. J. Reiskius. Oxford, 1828. Indices for Antiphon, 
Aeschines, Andocides, Deinarchus, Demades, Isaeus, 
Lysias, Lycurgus. 


“πάσα Demosthenicus—S. Preuss. ‘Teubner, 1892. 


Index Andocideus, Lycurgeus, Dinarcheus—\,. I, Forman. 
Oxford, 1897. 


Index Lystacus—D. Ἐς. Holmes. Bonn, 1895. 


lsaet Orationes ΑΙ cum fragmentis—G. Ἐς Schoemann. 
Gryphiswaldiae, 1831. 


Hyperdis Orationes Wi cum fragmentis—Fr. Blass. ‘Teubner, 
1894. 


Index Graecitatts Platonicae—T. Mitchell. Oxford, 1832. 
Index Aristotelicus—H. Bonitz. Berlin, 1870. 

Lexicon Theocriteum—l. Rumpel. ‘Teubner, 1879. 

Apollonit Argonautica—R. Merkel. ‘Teubner, 1854. 
Polybius—Wexicon, Ed., Schweighaeuser. Lipsiae, 1789-1795. 
Lexicon Polybianum—J. A. Ernesti. 1789-1795. 
Babrius—W.G. Rutherford. Macmillan ἃ Co., 1883. 


Dionysius of Halicarnassus: Epistola ad Pompetum, ludicium 
de Thucydide, Libellum de 115 quae Thucydidi propria 
sunt—C. G. Kriiger. Halis Saxonum, 1823. 


De Structura Orationis—J. Upton. London, 1747. 
sbi ἀρχαίων kptows—G. Holwell. London, 1778. 
περὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων ῥητόρων ὑπομνηματισμοί. | 
The Three Literary Letters—W. Rhys. Roberts. Cam- 
bridge, 1901. 


Index Graecitatis in Plutarcht Opera—D. Wyttenbach, Lip- 
siae, 1835. 


Etpicteteae Philosophiae Monumenta—I1. Schweighaeuser. 
Lipsiae, 1779. 


Apptan—lI. Schweighaeuser. Lipsiae, 1785. 
Luciani Opera—l. F. Reitzius. Amsterdam, 1743-46. 


Dio Cassius—¥. G. Sturzius. Lipsiae, 1824. 
Y. P. Boissevain. Berlin, 1898-1901. 


Herodian—Th. G. Irmisch. Lipsiae, 1805. 
Philostrati Opera—C. 1,. Kayser. ‘Teubner, 1870. 
Athenaeus—G. Kaibel. ‘Teubner, 1887-90. 
Sextus Empiricus—Im. Bekker. Berlin, 1842. 


Timaet Sophistae Lexicon Vocum Platonicarum—D. Ruhn- 
kenius. Lipsiae, 1828. 


Der Atticismus: Dionysius von Halikarnass bis auf den 
zweiten Philostratus—W. Schmid. Stuttgart, 1887-97. 


Rhetores Graeci—l,. Spengel. Teubner, 1854-85. 


Epigrammata Graeca ex Lapidibus Conlecta—G. Kaibel. 
Berlin, 1878. 


Lexicon Technologiae Graecorum Rhetoricae—l\. Chr. Th. 
Ernesti. Lipsiae, 1795. 


Greek Lexicon of the Roman & Byzantine Periods. 146 B. 
C.-1100 A. D.—E. A. Sophocles. Boston, 1870. 


Lexicon—H. G. Liddell and R. Scott. New York, 1889. 


9 


Synonyms of the New Testament—R. Ο. Trench. New York, 
1854. 


Lexicon of the New Testament Greek—H. Cremer (Trans. W. 
Urwick). Edinburgh, 1878. 


Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament—J.H.'Thayer. 
New York, 1897. : 


English-Greek Lexicon—C. D. Yonge. New York, 1893. 


Modern Greek and English Lexicon—P. D. Baleclariog, Jno. 
Pervanoglu. (Athens, 1894). 


A Modern Greek and English (and English-Greek) Lexicon 
—N.Contopoulos. London, 1880. (Athens,°1889). 


A Modern Greek Lexicon—R. A. Rhousopoulos. Leipzig, 
1900. 


Συναγωγὴη Λεξεων Λθησαυριστων εν τοις EdAnuxos Λεξικοις--ὲ, A. 
Koumanoudes. Athens, 1883. 


Sylogge Inscriptionum Boeoticarum—C. Keil. Lipsiae, 1847. 


English and Modern Greek Lexicon—A. A. Jannaris. Lon- 
don, 1895. 


10 


HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION. 


It is not our purpose to give a detailed account of the 
historical conditions in Greece in the first century of our era, 
but rather, to sketch those conditions briefly, with a view 
merely to establishing the necessary environment for our 
subsequent study of certain ethical ideas that gained favor 
in that century. ‘The interrelation of these is obvious, and 
just as the moral ideal was largely shaped by that environ- 
ment within which it grew, so it reacted upon its own envir- 
onment and was, in part, responsible for the trend of events. 

In general, the century was one of peace for Greece, 
greater than she had enjoyed since the days of the Mace- 
donian, but it was hardly a condition that encouraged great 
effort; it was, rather, the peace of exhaustion, with but 
a minimum of stimulus derived from her great western con- 
queror. 

Politically, economically, socially, the status of Greece in 
the first century A. D., was that of a conquered province, 
enfeebled, smitten with the consciousness of defeat, in the 
main quite fairly treated by Rome and often flattered, 
through all maintaining a great measure of self-esteem and 
pride. ᾿ 

Despite a technical freedom, Greece’s political position 
was insignificant; while the Greek cities felt that they were 
governing themselves’, since the management of police, build- 
ing, public worship, games, instruction, taxation and lesser 
legal administration were left to their own direction, yet the 
power of the Roman emperor and of his governor was ever 
present to interfere; there were no other channels of public 
activity into which men might direct their energies except 
those of municipal administration, and, in that age, such 
were narrow enough limits for ambition, and even within 
these freedom was conditional. Yet Rome, a generous 


1. Tac. Ann. xii. 58; Plin. Ep. x. 56; Liv. xlv. 18, 29; Paus. viii. 
30. 9. 


ὯΙ 


master in this instance, treated the cities of Greece with a 
consideration which was extended to no other conquered 
lands; and in the free cities she interfered as little as pos- 
sible with the affairs of government. Even of Domitian? it 
was said ‘‘ Provinciarum praesidibus coercendis tantum curae 
adhibuit, ut neque modestiores umquam neque iustiores 
exstiterint”. At one time the Phil-Hellene Nero*® had even 
gone to the extreme of declaring Greece subject to no gover- 
nor and free from tribute. Hadrian also went to great 
lengths and the settled calm of Greece affords a striking con- 
trast to the restlessness of the tribes on the Euphrates, on 
the Danube, and in Great Britain. Among other reasons for 
such conduct on the part of Rome, there existed the fact of 
‘far greater similarity between the Greek and Roman spirit 
of municipal government than affinity with either the 
Eastern spirit of monarchical rule or the Northern spirit of 
personal freedom”. Notwithstanding such favors, the calm 
that existed in Greece was not the calm of freedom and of 
self-government, but the calm of submission, of indifference, 
of exhaustion! 

Greece was utterly incapable of benefiting from the 
idea of Pan-Hellenism* imposed from without, and the num- 
erous beneficial acts of Hadrian, in the way of roads, 
aqueducts, temples, baths, when Athens was, perhaps, 
externally more splendid than ever before, did not improve 
her economic condition, neither increasing the resources of 
the land nor appreciably improving the condition of the in- 
dustrial classes. In some cases, communities lacked the 
means to keep even the existing public works in repair. ‘The 
land was only moderately fertile, agriculture was of limited 
extent, vine-culture was unimportant®, and that of the olive, 
little less so; the marble quarries did not benefit the general 
population, nor were there any manufactures of significance. 


2. Suet. Dom. 8; true of other emperors, Tac. Ann. iii. 10, Suet. 
_ Claud. 14, 15. | 
3. Vespasian annulled these acts, Paus. Ach. vii. 17.2. 
4, Keil. 5011. Inser. B.31, Plut. Arist. 19, C.I. G. 5852, Dion Cass. 
ixix. 10, Waddington iii.i.807, Paus. 1.18.9. 
5. Liv. xxxi. 24. Strabo ἃ Paus., passim. Lampridius, in Alex. 
p. 122. 


12 


The financial administration of the Romans produced disas- 
trous consequences both on the material prosperity of the 
country and on the moral constitution of society; the govern- 
ment of Rome was so lax, that mismanagement and robbery 
often went unpunished®. While Asia Minor and Syria 
recovered their commercial prosperity, Greece lagged behind; 
Corinth and Patrae were the chief centers of real activity in 
Greece, but they flourished only because they were Roman 
colonies and were impoitant to Rome. Athen'’s supremacy 
was completely gone. Under the rule of the Flavian’ 
emperors, the Roman system of financial administration and 
of taxation was directly responsible for reducing Greece to 
her lowest state of poverty and depopulation. The tenden- 
cies of society were toward the accumulation® of property in 
the hands of a few; ‘‘latifundia” had destroyed the 
yeomanry; the gulf between the few rich noble families and 
the great body of poor was widened. ‘There was a general 
accumulation of debts throughout the country®. The 
depopulation!® of the country, dating from the destruction 
of Thebes, of Corinth and Megara, was appalling, and even 
the masculine type had declined!!. On every hand there 
were signs of the economic distress, decay, exhaustion??, 
‘which Rome could not have stayed, had she so willed. 
While thus in politics there was no opportunity or at 
least but slight encouragement for the exercise of talent, 
while economic conditions offered no inducements to ambi- 
tion,—-socially, the position of Greece was very unimportant 
in the world. In art, philosophy and literature, in which 
she expressed her truer, better self, Greece was still mistress 
of the world. It was because of her primacy in these, that 
she returned the scorn of the Roman people with a disdain, 
equally unjustifiable. Despite the supremacy of Greece in 
such matters, the Romans failed to appreciate the Greeks 


6. Cic. In. Verr. 1.2, Tac. Ann. 1.76, Suet. Claud. 25. 

7. Paus. Ach. vii, 17.2. Suet. Vesp. 8. 

8. Tac. Ann. xv. 20. Strabo. x. 2.25. 

9. Plut. ‘*De vitando aere alieno’’. 

10. Strabo. ix. 1.15., ix. 2.25, viiiand x. passim, Plut. De Def. Or. c. 8. 
11. Dio. Orat. 21. 501. R. 
12. Suet. Tib. 32, Juv. 5. viii. 87, Cic. ad fam. 4.5.4. Philo. ii. 302. 12. 


13 


as a people, who were included in a general sentence of con- 
demnation of the whole East and who were misunderstood, 
by reason of the baser types that appeared in large numbers 
from the East, in Rome. The Greeks of Hellas had no social 
standing in Rome. ‘There was, to be sure, great decline in 
vigor, and moral energy was seriously threatened, if not, 
perhaps, undermined; there was a decline of families, and 
the Greek world had all the petty weaknesses and vices that 
naturally exist in a secluded'*, overripe and decaying 
society. Yet Juvenal was “οὐ acquainted with the δες in the 
Greek nature, and Tacitus’ stricture was one-sided!?. 

The Greek world was by no means hopelessly lost, even 
after the political and economic death and social decline. In 
the arts, in literature, in philosophy, Greece lived again and 
gave evidence of a fine nature and culture, in which old 
traditions were fondly blended with new ideals. It is a well- 
known fact that “the defeated Hellenism......... still 
created the conceptions by means of which the new religion 
shaped itself into a dogma”!*,. The Greek’s attitude toward 
God powerfully affected his relation toward his fellow-man; 
it is his ethical 1deal in the first century of our era that con- 
stitutes the subject of the following prolegomena. 

13. Lucian, Cataplus i. 351. 
4, Tac. Hist. iii. 47, Ann. ii. 55., Plin. Ep. x. 49, Dion Cass. liv. 7. 
15. Windelband. 


14 


STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM 
AND OF METHODS. 


We have made the ethical vocabulary of Plutarch' the 
basis of our study of this problem of the ethical ideal of the 
Greek of the first century A. ἢ. Reading the ‘‘Moralia” of 
Plutarch, one very soon becomes conscious of the presence of 
a large number of ethical terms that do not belong to the 
classical vocabulary. These words are so numerous and their 
character so varied that it at once becomes apparent that 
they must be of considerable significance. Upon closer in- 
vestigation”, it appears that some of these ethical terms 
occur for the first time in literature, in Polybius and in the 
Septuagint, while others seem to appear, first, in the first 
century B. C., and others till not laterin Plutarch and his 
contemporaries; as these terms are also found in the N. T., 
in inscriptions’, in ecclesiastical literature for a long period 
of several hundred years, and, further, have a place in the 
modern Greek vocabulary, it is clear that they are not merely 
ephemeral terms, begotten of either local or sporadic or 
short-lived needs, but are the product of a deep-seated, vital 
disturbance in the ethical consciousness; the thought interest 
and activity behind the words was strong and imperative, 
and, as we shall see, the ethical movement, of much impor- 


1. Plutarch represents the spirit of his age better than any of his 
contemporaries, reflecting not only the personal equation, but also ‘“‘die 
Resultate der ethischen Reflexion eines ganpen Zeitalters’”’ (Schmidt, 
p. 40). Itis all the more possible to study the religious, political, philo- 
sophical, ethical problems of the age through the works of the sage of’ 
Chaeronea, as his outlook was broad and his interpretation, mild. 

2. We have, by means of lexica and indices and wide readings de- 
termined, with considerable accuracy, the time and place limits within 
which these terms were employed. 

3. Our inscriptional evidence has not yet been organized, nor is it 
directly applied in the later discussions; its value is very great, how- 
ever, and the popular, oral currency,—the colloquial character of many 
of these ethical terms is demonstrated. 


15 


tance. Α study of these terms should, then, throw some 
light upon the problem of the status of morals in Greece, in 
the Plutarchean age. 

With Plutarch occupying the central point in this study 
of ethical ideas, some of which existed even before his day, 
and all of which lived long after his time*, we find that 
every one of the terms considered is an expression of an 
ethical movement that was operating in Greek life and thus 
exerting a pressure upon the old vocabulary. While it may, 
perhaps, be impossible to say, precisely, how far the ethical 
ideas were assimilated and how far they became a part of 
the common intelligence, at any rate, it becomes very evident 
that these words are expressions of virtues that were admired 
and cultivated and of vices that were condemned by the 
Greek people of the first century, and represent the working 
of positive forces in the development of the race®. 

The discussion that follows takes into account the fol- 
lowing terms: «awodoyia, εὑρεσιλογία, ταπεινός, ταπεινοφροσύνη, 
μετριοπάθεια͵ ἀνεξικακία͵ ἀγαθοποιία, κοινωφελία, μεγαλωφελία͵ μεγαλοεργία, 
κενοδοξία, περιαυτολογία͵ κενοσπουδία, ματαιοπονία, μισαδελφία, κοσμοπολί.- 
της, πειθήνιος͵ ἠθοποιία ὃ, 


4. ῆΥἧε Βᾶνθ, of course, in the case of every word, carefully con- 
sidered every passage in which that term was found, noting, in some 
cases, a growth in the meaning of the word. 

5. The new ethical vocabulary is only a part of a larger body of 
new terms that the Greek language, in becoming a world-instrument, 
created, when demands were made upon it, to express the conceptions 
that came with a wider experience; this process had been notably in 
effect since the days of the Roman conquest and Polybius shows many 
signs of it. A complete study of this new vocabulary, in its entirety, 
though important, does not fall within our province. 

6. This list of words is but a small, though significant portion of 
the entire new ethical vocabulary, which may receive some illustration 
. from the following terms: ὑπακοή, ἀκενόδοξον͵ εὐπρόσδεκτος, μακροθυμία͵ 
ἀπειραγαθία, φιλόκαινος, φιλοκομπία, φιληδονία, φιλαθλητής͵ πλουτοποιός͵ 
μεγαλοπάθεια͵ πολυπάθεια, ὀλιγοπράγμων, μεγαλοποιέω, ὀλιγόφρων͵ ξενομανέω,͵ 
μικρόλυπος, ἀλλοτριοπραγία, προπάθεια, παραχωρητικός͵ δυσήκοος͵ ὀλιγόφρων͵ 
---ὀινόληπτος, οἴνωσις, μοιχικός͵ τοκογλύφος, ὀικοδέσποινα,͵ Χρεωφειλέτης, 
ἀμέθυστος͵ - μεγαλορρημοσύνη, φιλειδήων͵ γλισχρολογία, ἑτοιμολόγος, κατα- 
λαλία, καταφρυάσσομαι,͵ ἀργολογία͵ ----προσεπιζητέω͵ προσεπισημαίνω, συνε- 
Opry ew, ἐνεπιδείκνυμι, συνεκπλήσσω͵ συμφιλοτιμέομαι, συνεπιθειάζω͵ συνεκ- 
δέχομαι, ehisartberis , €CUPLETAOOTOS, εὐμετάστατος, προσεκτυφλόω, προυχύλεϊῳ ὃ 


16 


It is our belief that a philological-psychological study 
of the mental state of the Greeks of the first century, 
furnishes valuable clues, tending to elucidate the obscure 
problems of Greek ethics and religion of that period. An 
insight into the inner life of thought and feeling of the 
Greek people may enable us to apprehend the true nature of 
a very complex age, by no means as yet thoroughly under- 
stood. 

Anticipating the statement of our conclusions, it may 
perhaps be apposite to state, here, that one might seriously 
doubt the validity of the generalization that the Greek 
society of this era was ἃ fossil society, feeding upon its 
own traditions and petrified beyond the hope of rengovation 
or healthy growth”’. Nor is it absolutely true that “‘the 
ideal of the Conscience belonged to the great foe of Greece’’®. 
Rather, that very ideal was growing and developing within 
the limits of Greek experience, and as shown by the language, 


σανανασώζω,͵ καταπροίεμαι͵ --διαπικραίνομαι,͵ ἐκπαθής͵ περιπαθής͵ διαγριαίνω, 
κατευλογέω, ἐκταπεινόω, The constant reference to privaie affairs and vir- 
tues is noteworthy; the interests of the zvdividua/ constitute the starting 
point for the development of this system of ethics. There is abundant 
evidence of interest in petty concerns; the very large number of new 
double compound terms evinces, if not a desire for exact expression or 
of restoring to words the force they have lost, a fondness for pompous 
and picturesque effects, a tendency toward elaboration and an attention 
to detail, just as characteristic of decadent literature as of the arts. 
Another group deserving attention is that of ‘‘strengthened’’ terms; 
these words, while showing that tendency toward exaggeration charac- 
teristic of language in its decline, are a mockery of an age that we 
know was characterized by feeble feelings, lesser impulses, minor am- 
bitions,—of which the numerous late diminutives are a truer expression. 
This large body of words gives a picture of a society, ‘hastening to ex- 
plain everything in its decline’, but at the same time aspiring to lofty 
virtues. 

We are at first surprised that Plutarch seems to have borrowed so 
little from the Latin ethical vocabulary, but, as is well known, his 
“Demosthenes” begins with an apology for his slight knowledge of 
Latin. Apart from public life, Latin was never so widely learned iu 
Greece as Greek was in the Roman world, all the time from the Scipios 
to Marcus Aurelius. (Cic. Arch. 23. Senec. Consol. ad Helv. 6.8. Juv. 
15.110. Quint. i. 1.12. Suet. Claud. 42. Plut. i.564E.) 

7. Mahaffy.c.12. ‘‘ The Greek World Under Roman Sway.”’ 

8. Wedgwood. p. 129. 


17 


that infallible formula of a people, the Greek temperament 
was undergoing a subtle transformation, knowledge of which 
ought to correct the only too often preferred charges of 
‘““stagnancy” and a ‘“‘contemptible decadence”, made against 
the Greek of the first century. While itis true that Plutarch 
‘*rehabilitates the ancient sanctions of morality and of 
religion”®, at the same time, unconsciously, perhaps, he be- 
comes the high priest of a mew moral aspiration. 


9. Wenley. ‘‘Plutarch and His Age’’. p. 267. 


18 


DISCUSSION. 


Καινολογία. 


The keen versatility and vivacity of the Greek mind 
naturally took delight in new language formations; this 
neologistic tendency was as ancient as Homer’, and was very 
marked throughout the entire history of the people, as we 
see, for example, in Aeschylus, Aristophanes, the rhetori- 
cians”, Thucydides*, Demosthenes, Polybius and Plutarch. 
The mental activity of the race, thus, in time, produced a 
vocabulary of extraordinary variety, to which free fancy 
contributed, as much as need. 

When Polybius* uses the term xawodoyia, (not occurring 
‘in Greek literature before his time), we are left in doubt 
whether he has coined a new term or is employing (as was 
possible for one who was writing in the “‘common dialect” 
and employing a less pure vocabulary), a word, current be- 
fore his day but which had not yet crept into formal litera- 
ture; this problem is of less consequence to us however, than 
the problems suggested by the use of the word in Polybius 
and in later writers. Polybius attributes καινολογία to Greek 
ambassadors, whose “‘strange phraseology” vexed the Roman 
senate; the latter fact is significant, as the more conserva- 
tive® Romans would not, unnaturally, be vexed at Athenian 
eee 


1. Ewustathius, 1801, 27, calls Homera καινολόγος δέ τις ποιητής, 

2. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, (De Lys. p. 458) speaking of Greek 
literary styles, of the use of figures, of hyperboles, of καινολογία says 
δηλοῖ δὲ τοῦτο Γοργίας τε ὃ Acovrivos, cf. also Soph. Tr. 873. 

3. Thucydides, 3.38, bears witness to the Athenian fondness for 
new phrases and novelty in language. 

4. 36. Laid: 

5. Hor. A. P. 45 seq. The Horatian dictum is not irreconcilable 
with Plautine, Lucretian and Ciceronian usage. 


19 


In Strabo® we find a similar admission that man (i. 6. a 
Greek) in general, and children, in particular, were fond of 
the strange and the new’; a recommendation of myths fol- 
lows, as being καινολογία ris, on the ground that the element of 
novelty is an incentive to learning and provokes the desire 
to learn. The apologetic use of the new term suggests that 
it does not belong to the pure Greek vocabulary and thus, 
perhaps, throws light on the problem, raised, above, in 
Polybius. 

The word, καινολογία, which we find, first, in Polybins, 
also occurs in Plutarch® andin Herodianus®. For the student 
of the new ethical vocabulary of Plutarch, the changed at- 
titude of the great moralist toward neologizing, in general, 
is most important; his derision of the practice of the Greek 
Stoics who go to extreme lengths and are excessively given 
to xawodoyia, for its own sake, is evidence of his own conserva- 
tism and is positive proof that the numerous ethical terms 
that will be our particular study, were neither coined nor 
employed by him without a serious motive. We can rest 
assured, in all our subsequent work, that words were, with 
him, vztal. 


Ἐύρεσιλογία. 

That the term εὑρεσιλογία stands for a certain activity, 
contemporary with the life of the word itself, cannot be 
doubted. The term means loquacity, skill in finding words, 
command of words, quibbling, sophistical use of words, 
multiplying or inventing words, and is used of an idle use of 
words, as opposed to efficient labor or sincere search for truth. 
The idea is one, closely associately with xawodoyia, discussed 
above, and a similar impulse must have created them both. 

A consideration of the Greek attitude toward εὑρεσιλογία 
and the mental processes involved, is of prime importance,— 


6. i. 2.8. 


ὅ. In the same passage, Strabo employs another new term, 
φιλειδήμων͵ 

8. ii. 1068 Ὁ. Plutarch’s conservatism is a matter of much impor- 
tance in this connection. 

9. Epim. p. 3. 


20 


is, in fact, a necessary preliminary, for the student of the 
new ethical vocabulary of Plutarch, as it gives a preliminary 
knowledge of the ethical standard of the people who coined 
the new vocabulary, and assists us to a proper interpretation 
of the terms themselves. 

The character and the extent of the acizvity defined by 
εὑρεσιλογία, are the two points of particular importance, for 
which the passages, in which the term occurs, furnish 
evidence. ἱ 

Polybius’! use of the word indicates that to his mind it 
meant idle argument, mere loquacity. Philo? associates it 
with γλισχρολογία (itself a new term), uses it of quibbling of 
the Stoics, of research and of defence turned to bad account, 
and of idle prosecution, so that εὑρεσιλογία, not necessarily bad 
in itself, becomes so by implication. Diodorus*® says Alex- 
ander καθόλου δὲ rods ταῖς εὑρησιλγίαις κατασοφιζομέντυς τὴν δύναμιν τῆς 
πεπρωμένης ἐβλασφήμει, Diodorus does not always, however, 
use the term with reproach. Cornutus* opposes Herakles to 
6 εὑρεσιλόγος and it is obvious that the latter was a factor in 
the writer’s own experience. Strabo® says οὗ γραμματικοὶ μυθάρια 
παραβάλλοντες εὑρεσιλογοῦσι μᾶλλον ἢ λύουσι τὰ ζητούμενα } 
Arrian® is opposed to unprincipled, clever εὑρεσίλογοι. Eyuse- 
bius’ and Clemens® Alexandrinus view the activity with dis- 
favor and discourage the spread of the evil. Sextus 
Empiricus® accuses the Dogmatists of εὑρεσιλογα. Diogenes 
Laertius'®, with this term, characterizes the philosophers 
Menedemus, Arcesilaus and Stilpo,—not necessarily with any 
evil association. Athenaeus!! quotes (not, perhaps, exactly) 
Polybius, and expresses little regard for the quality. In the 
Oracula Sibyllina!?, οἱ εὑρεσίλογοι are included in a category 


Polybius. 18. 29.3. 

Philo. i. 698.45; ii. 492.16; i. 628.50; i. 314.29; ii. 49.24. 
Diod. 17. 116.4. i. 37.9. 
Cornut. 191. 

Strabo. 13. i. 69,17. i. 34. 
Arr. Epict. 2.20. 35. 

Kus. ii. 89. B. 

Clem. Al. ii. 561. A. 

Sext. Emp. i. 63. 

Diog. Ly. ii. 134; iv. 37; ii. 113. 
Ath. 193 D. 

Or. Sib. i. 178. 


PPS Ae 


bab pet pet 
Nr oS 


21 


of the worst criminals. Suidas!* defines the term with the 
help of φλύαρος and éromodrdyos. Finally, Plutarch’*, earlier 
than the last and later than the first authors, quoted, 
occupies, too, a mean position in his understanding and 
application of the word and in the consequent feeling he 
entertained toward such to whom the word applied; in other 
words, he accuses the Stoics of εὑρεσιλογία, associates εὑρεσιλογία 
with παιδιά and opposes it to work worthy of the greatest zeal, 
but he also employs it, once, without any evil signification 
whatever, of a party of his guests who have engaged in 
clever argument and word play. 

It is clear, therefore, that εὑρεσιλογία is an expression of a 
tendency, not, perhaps, new!* in Greek life, but sufficiently 
strong from the time of Polybius on, to result in the coinage 
of the new term under consideration. It has been shown 
that the habit had a bad aspect which seemed to prevail over Ὁ 
the less harmful, in consequence of which, the εὑρεσιλόγος͵ in 
life, was rather the quibbler and the sophist than the 
eloquent, earnest searcher for truth. By the time of Plutarch, 
the meaning of the word was crystallized; its signification 
in the ‘‘Moralia” is suggested in the literature before his 
day, as it is confirmed in the later literature. 

As in the case of καινολογία, so Plutarch’s attitude toward 
the activity expressed by εὑρεσιλογία, also, is clearly defined, 
and his serious employment of the more strictly ethical 
terms receives illumination therefrom. 


Ταπεινός. 


Before considering the significance of ταπεινοφροσύνη, it 
seems desirable to trace out, however incompletely, the his- 
torical development of the meaning of ταπεινός, in Greek lit- 


13. Suid. Fr. Gr. 68. 

14. Plut. ii. 625 C.; ii. 656 A-B; ii. 28 A; ii. 31. E; ii. 1033 B; ii. 1070 
F; ii. 1072 F; ii. 414 A. 

15. ‘The idea that the word expresses, existed at least as early as the 
time of Pindar (0.9.120. εὑρησιεπής). If events of the early democracy 
could and did create this specific notion, we are not surprised to find a 
recurrence of that process of thought in the Graeco-Roman period, suc- 
ceeding upon the wisdom of the Alexandrian age. 


22 


erature and life. With this in view, we have made a study 
of ταπεινός in Aeschylus!, Euripides, Demosthenes, Aristotle 
(Eth. & Pol.), and Plutarch (Moralia). A knowledge of the 
reception accorded “‘humility”*® at an earlier time is of great 
importance for the student of Plutarchean ethics. 


We find, first, in the early period, evidences of a bold 
spirit to which humility was alien; second, at a later time, 
evidence of a negative and halting recognition of humility, 
at a time when we would expect suffering to bring out the 
trait, if it were in the national character; third, evidence of 
a greater leniency, in the century of Athens’ supreme con- 
flict, coupled, however, in the same age, with a philosphical 
system that grew out of an atmosphere in which humility 
could hardly thrive and be recognized as a virtue; and fourth, 
lastly, an attitude in which new tendencies, more generous 
and more cosmopolitan, appear, but in which the old stan- 
dards, though withdrawing into the background, do not 
vanish! | 3 

In Aeschylus®, ταπεινός is used of a lowering in rank, at 
one time, of Prometheus, whom Oceanus counsels, urging 
submission to a resistless power, (the course is not dishonor- 
able, but, nevertheless, for Prometheus an unendurable hum- 
iliation),—at another, of Zeus; this time the condition is 
one to which his archenemy would reduce him (with the 
commentary of δουλεύειν). The state, characterized by ταπεινός, 
provokes scorn and contempt. Without any suggestion of 
evil or wickedness, the state is quite intolerable, merely 
because it is low; humility is slavery and no free-born Greek 
admires it. 

In Euripides, we find a deeper interpretation and a wider 
application of the term; it signifies, first, as before, humili- 
ation; but also, second, submissive humility; and, third, 
wickedness and depravity. Certain passages* reflect the old 
inherent tendency in the Greek character to respect strength, 


1. ταπεινός does not seem to occur in Homer nor in Sophocles. 

2. We reserve, for the future, the study of such words and phrases as 
χαμαίζηλον,͵ βαιός͵ ταπείνωσις͵ ταπεινότης, σμικρὸν φρονεῖν͵ μετρίως φρονεῖν. 

3. Aes. Pr. 320, 908, 926. 

4. Eur. Fr. xxii. 2; iii. 2; xxx. 4. 


23 


success and wealth, with little charity for their opposites. 
In the second place®,tarevos is predicated of Andromache, of 
Orestes, of Herakles, and we find a new suggestion, not 
openly expressed but clearly implied, of leniency toward sub- 
mission and humility; but the circumstances are of the most 
trying nature and these alone render humility excusable. 
Submission or humility does not necessarily entail loss of 
honor or self-respect. It does not, regardless of causes, 
awaken a strong revulsion of feeling. In the third place®, 
the word is used of Odysseus, of Orestes and of Pylades, of 
Agamemnon, and of Helen and falls from hostile lips; it 
signifies baseness, cowardice, disgrace, and is a term of 
strong condemnation. ΤῊΣ treatment of the word shows a 
development of the idea, a growth and quickening of the 
moral consciousness. 

The three distinct senses of the word that we have 
observed, are still more clearly marked in Demosthenes; the 
tendencies we have noticed before are more sharply defined. 
Demosthenes uses the word first’, of Philip, of the Athenian 
army, of Thebes—with the old implications of weakness, of 
humiliation, insignificance, lack of pride, and always with 
an association of scorn andcontempt. ‘The term is, however, 
also used in a milder sense’; it is used of Athens, in her final 
struggles, in her helplessness, with deep reproach to be sure 
and with a suggestion of loss of prestige and earlier reputa- 
tion and of pride, but still with no loss of honor. That it 
was possible to associate and even identify the idea with 
μέτριος is an indication of a movement toward greater leniency, 
on the part of the Athenian public,—the common people to 
whom Demosthenes made his pleas, and in whom humility 
inspired pity. In the third place®, that other sense of posi- 
_ tive evil has become thoroughly established. 

In Aristotle, we see the earlier meaning more clearly. 
The tone of Demosthenes is mild, that of Aristotle reminds 
us of the past; the former is decidedly a man of his age; the 


Eur, Andr. 165. 971. Her. F. 1406. (cf. Xen. Cyr. 5.1.5.) 

Eur. Hec. 245. Orest. 1411. Iph. A. 339. Troad. 1018. Fr. ii. 1. 
Dem. i. 9; 4.23; 9.21; 16.24; 19.325; 61.25. 

Dem. 8.67; 1074; 13.25; 21. 183-6; 45.4; 57.45. 

Dem. 18. 108; 18. 178. 


Ὁ oN ὁ. οι 


24 


latter has inherited more of the earlier temper; the former. 
speaks the note of the struggling democracy, the latter, the 
eulogy of the once proud state. We have, here, indications 
of the old pride, of scorn for weakness, together with a care- 
ful effort to attain moderation in all matters; hence the 
tameavol were certain to meet with censure in Aristotle, as 
the word meant, to him, a failure to attain that mean, 
whether the word had a social, moral or political application. 
This is an aristocratic society the exercise of whose virtues 
requires wealth and leisure and noble birth. ‘The ταπεινός 19 
is humble, cannot be liberal, is easily a flatterer, and is 
servile; for him Aristotle can have no words except of con- 
demnation. ‘This probably represents the essentially Greek 
attitude and ὃ ταπεινός incurs the strong displeasure of the 
Greek, less because he may be base or wicked than because 
he is low. Σωφροσύνη is the mean opposed to ὕβρις, and not 
tareworys! Here, most clearly, we see the slight recognition 
of humility, the absence of mercy toward the lowly, the 
assertion of an old confidence within conscious, artistic 
limits. | 

We find the three significations we have noticed before, 
still more clearly defined in Plutarch. He could say: 
ἐχθροῦ δὲ τὸ τιμωρίαν παραλιπεῖν καιροῦ παρασχόντος ἐπιεικές ἐστι 
(90 F), εὐγένεια καλὸν μέν͵ ἀλλὰ προγόνων ἀγαθόν (5 D), and ἐγὼ γὰρ 
μάλιστ᾽ ἂν βουλοίμην πᾶσι κοινῇ χρήσιμον εἶναι τὴν ἀγωγήν (8 EF). This 
is evidenee οὗ a greater equalization of classes, of ἃ break- 
ing down of old distinctions. Thus we find, in the matter 
of tarevos, first, a recognition, to be sure, of the old feeling 
which does not disappear,—but second, at the same time, a 
greater forgiveness, extended to the humble and the lowly 
who cannot be accused of evil, and,—third, finally, a certain 
indulgence, even in the case of evil that ταπεινός may suggest. 
The Greek of this late period has not entirely lost the dis- 
tinctive traits of his ancestors; humility!!, submission, sub- 


10. Arist. H§8. 112422; H§8. 11252; n.e.y, 3. 123112; ἡ. 6. y, 6. 
1233013; n.e.n. 11. 1244°6; ap 7. 1251b15, 25; a, y, 13. 1284741; π᾿ 8, 11. 
1295°18; a, 6. 11. 1313541; πὶ 6. 11. 13156’; w, O, 2. 1337°14. 

11. Plut. ii. 91 C; ii. 111 F; ii. 266 D; ii. 276 D; ii. 584 Εἰ; ii. 762 ΕἸ; 
ii. 805 D; ii. 807 E; ii. 822 D; ii. 1046 C; ii. 1060 A. 


25 


ordination,—without, in any sense, being connected with 
evil,—still were likely to provoke his scorn and even his 
indignation. At the same time, in spite of this apparent 
pride, events of several hundred years have greatly modified 
his character, and, with it, his attitude in this matter. The 
former note is a protest, an old strain that wz// assert itself; 
but, with this, there appears!” a more generous inclination 
toward the humble and the lowly, whether thus through the 
accident of birth, through sorrow, or through sin. 

But the pagan Greek position could never, probably, be 
that which we find in the Scriptures!*, where this word is 
used of the noblest and the most necessary of all the virtues. 
There it conveys a sense of honor unknown to the Greek, but 
suited to the Hebraic and to the Christian world!*. Sucha 
conception was foreign to the Greek nature; if suggestions 
of such a feeling appear, at times, as in Plato’®, and, later, 
more frequently, in Plutarch, it means that, within Greek 
limitations, an evolution was taking place in philanthropy, 
which, though more merciful than ever before, nevertheless 
still remained pagan'®, 

Ταπεινοφροσύνη. 


The word ταπεινόφρων, while occurring in the Septuagint, 
does not recur, again, until Plutarch’s time, and becomes 
common, only later, in the Patristic literature. 

The feeling, of which it is an expression, is a funda- 
mental one which would effect all thought, feeling and con- 
duct. In the Septuagint on the one hand, and in the New 
Testament and in a large body of Patristic literature on the 
other, the virtue of ταπεινοφροσύνη is accepted without reserva- 
tion; it is constantly encouraged and recommended with 
other virtues; nor is it merely an ideal that provokes exhor- 
tation, but often, by implication, and frequently, expressly, 
is acknowledged a fact in Greek life. ‘‘Humility” then, was 


12. Plut. 11. 357 A; ii. 599 B; ii. 806 A; ii. 822 D; ii. 1069 C. 

13. Ν. T. Math. 11.29; Luc. 14.11; Peter i. 5.5; L. XX. Pr. 1619. 
14. See discussion of ταπεινοφροσύνη. 

15. Plato. Legg. iv. 716 A (cf. Origen. i. 1312 C.) 

16. . Plutarch favored slavery and was an aristocrat. 


26 


a factor in the evolution of Greek ομπαγαοίογ᾽, as early as the 
time of the Septuagint’ * and as late as the fourth century 
after Christ, and was operating in Greek communities in 
Asia Minor and Alexandria in the East, and in Rome, in the 
West. 

While it is impossible to determine to what extent such 
suggestions were immediately operative, the fact remains 
that the suggestion was there, and, certainly, later, bore 
fruit. Ignatius’, writing to the Ephesians, exhorts them to 
be ταπεινόφρονες:. he contrasts that frame of mind with 
μεγαλορρημοσύνη and unites it with πραότης, Barnabas? feels it 
to be a man’s duty to obey the Lord’s commands, not to exalt 
one’s self but to be ταπεινόφρων, In the Doctrina Orientalis®, 
the Lord is praised for his great ταπεινοφροσύνη. Peter’ urges 
all men to be compassionate and humble-minded. Paul® 
urges the Ephesians and the Philippians to follow his 
example of serving the Lord with all humility, meekness 
and long-suffering. In Basilius® we find the dictum that he 
is great in the sight of the Lord who has yielded ταπεινοφρόνως 
to his neighbor. ‘Tertullian'’® preaches great ταπεινοφροσύνη, 
with endurance of hunger, thirst and imprisonment. Ori- 
gen'', blames Celsus for bis misconception of ταπεινοφροσύνη 
and even finds encouragement of the virtue in Plato. His 
own defence of the quality is unequivocal. Hippolytus!? 
cites the case of Nabouchodonosor, who regained his king- 


1. Ταπεινότης͵ the earlier term, has not the significance of noble 
humility we find associated with ταπεινοφροσύνη. In a moral sense, it 
implies baseness,—as, in Plat. Pol. 309 A., joined with ἀμαθία, in Arist. 
Rhet. ii. 6. 1384, synonymous with μικροψυχία, and in Dem. 151.9 united 
with ddogia, 

Qe ERX. Pas'131..2. 

3. LXX. Prov. 29.23. 

4.. Ignat. X. 64 (653 A.) 

5. Barn. 777 B. 

6. Doctr. Or. 656 A. 

7. Ν. T. Petr. 1.3.8. 

8. N. T. Act. 20.19; Ep. Eph. 4.2. (Also, Ep. Phil, 2.3.) 

9. Basil. iv. 813 A. 

10. Tertull. ii. 970 A. 
11. Origen. i. 1312 D; vii. 217 B; i. 1312C. 
12. Hippol. 681 A; 856 B. 


27 


dom through ταπεινοφροσύνη, and quotes the Evangelist John 
as authority for the Lord’s ταπεινοφροσύνη. Hermas’* promises 
God’s pity to those who repent and become humble. 
Clemens!* Romanus exhorts all to live in concord and sanc- 
tity, to avoid pride and arrogance, and to be examples to 
others of ταπεινοφροσύνη, which servants of the Lord practice. 

Between the two temporal extremes, considered above, 
we find the term employed in Plutarch, in Arrian and in 
Josephus, and the distinctly different feeling entertained 
toward the quality is very significant. While there is no 
question of the unreserved welcome, extended the virtue in 
these two extreme periods, and, too, no question of its actual 
practice, we find a different ethical standard, a tentative 
reserve, expressed in the middle period. 


Neither in Plutarch, nor in Josephus, nor in Arrian has 
the word the same connotation of meaning we have found in 
the passages quoted above, and, in consequence, we find a 
different attitude toward the taravddpoves, Plutarch!® with 
all his generosity, feels a reserve toward this virtue, which 
to his mind implies, at least, a loss of noble spirit and thus ap- 
proaches dangerously near baseness. Josephus!® relates how 
the Roman Galba, accused, by the soldiers, of ταπεινοφροσύνη, 
was treacherously put to death. Such ‘‘ weak-mindedneéss”, 
approaching ‘‘meanness” or ‘‘cowardice”, was associated by 
Arrian’’ with the vice of κολακεία, 


Thus, while in the first century A. D., Greek Ethics did 
not, as yet, welcome the idea of humility, still the idea was 
a present force that was at work in the Greek consciousness 
and, in time, produced great psychic changes. Although 
the idea did not receive complete acceptance in Plutarch’s 
day, yet it was not ostracized, and the Greek mind gradually 
became accustomed to it,—more so, even in the first century 
A. D., than the above study would seem to indicate. ‘The 


13. Herm. Sim. 7; Vis. 3.10. 

14. Clem. R. i.2; 1.19; i.30; 1.44 (cf. also Or. Sib. 8.481) 1.48 (cf. also 
Cl. Al. i.532 B). 

15. Plut. ii. 336E; ii. 475E. 

16. Jos. B. J. 4.9.2. 

17. Arr. Epict. i.9.10; 3.24.56. 


28 


presence of other virtues, such as ἀνεξικακία, μετριοπάθεια and 
ἀγαθοποιΐα, closely related to ‘‘humility”, demonstrates this! 
Still it is difficult to resist the conclusion that the Greek 
temper was still essentially proud'®. 

As the prejudice, however, against ““humility” broke 
down, there was wide room for sympathy, equality and kind- 
ness. At the same time that ἀγαθοποιΐα͵ ἀνεξικακία and μετριοπά-. 
Gea flourish, (forces that would help to break down that 
prejudice and to create the necessary environment for 
humility”) real strength, including audacity, courage 
and μεγαλοεργία, gradually vanishes, and an epoch of weakness 
ts ushered in, also fostering a constantly growing humility’? ; 
for these virtues inevitably acted and reacted upon one 
another?’?®. 


Μετριοπάθεια. 


The previous study of ταπεινός and of ταπεινοφροσύνη has 
led us to believe that the Greek character of Plutarch’s day 
was, still, proud and essentially pagan; that is, despite a 
certain great philanthropy, humility was not yet welcomed, 
without reserve. It was, nevertheless, an existing force that 
could not be overlooked, whose influence is further traceable 
in other virtues, as that of μετριοπάθεια͵ 

While μετριοπάθεια, in its form at least, truthfully reflects 
the spirit of the past’, expressing that artistic proportion? 
that was consciously sought in the sphere of the feelings as 
in everything else, yet that very artistic and hence exclusive 
spirit, of which we have a reminiscence in the form of this 
word, yielded to other, humanizing influences, of which 


18. See also discussion of ταπεινός, 

19. Weare not surprised, therefore, to find other ideas. besides the 
one of “‘thinking’’, viz. of ‘“‘saying’’ and of ‘‘doing’’, united, in time, 
with the adjective ταπεινο-, and forming new compounds. 

20. See discussion of μετριοπάθεια͵ 


1, Plutarch constantly betrays the old Greek search for modera- 
tion; this essentially Greek strain still survives in his century. 
ἔντεχνον δέ τὸ τήν μέσην ἐν ἅπασι τέμνειν ἐμμελές τε, Plut. ii. 7B. 

2. Of which μετριόπης and σωφροσύνη, the ruling principle of 
Greek life, are further expressions. 


29 


ταπεινοφροσύνη was one. Under such influences, μετριοπάθεια 
acquired a meaning in Plutarch, it never could have possessed 
in Aristotle. 


We find the term employed from the time of Aristeas to 
that of Sextus Empiricus, and its significance is not the 
same throughout. ‘There are certainly no aesthetic implica- 
tions involved in the word, as applied to the Romans or to 
the Hebrews; the control of the feelings, in these instances, 
was referable, rather, to another sense,—that of duty and of 
honor. ‘The weakness, involved in Plutarch’s μετριοπάθεια, 
(Plutarch was not conscious of that weakness however) is 
felt, also, in Dionysius of Halicarnassus, in St. Paul, in 
Philo, but no trace of it appears in Appian or in Sextus 
Empiricus. 


- In Sextus Empiricus*® we find the position of the Skeptic 
defined, whose τέλος, in life, is ἀπάθεια in matters of opinion, 
and μετριοπάθεια in matters of necessity. As far as the Skeptic 
felt that the ἀταραξία of ἀπάθεια and that ἐποχή could secure him 
the greatest happiness, his life would be a practice of his 
ideal, and, to that extent, at least, μετριοπάθεια was a factor in 
Greek life for several hundred years. Appian* represents 
Pyrrhus of Epirus as possessing μετριοπάθεια, for sparing the 
conquered Romans and giving them peace. ‘The Numantini 
prayed Scipio for indulgence and μετριοπάθεια, There is none 
of the suggestion of weakness, here, that we shall find in 
Philo; as predicated of the Romans, united with σωφρόνισμα, 
associated with εὐσέβεια, identified with μέγαλοφροσύνη, μετριοτ-- 
ἄθεια means that heroic forbearance which had exalted the 
Roman race. ° 


Plutarch® attributes this virtue to Camillus, Metellus, 
Aristeides, Socrates and Stilpo; his recognition of the con- 
temporary practice of the virtue is coupled with an exhorta- 
tion for its wider employment. His association of μετριοπάθεια 
with πραότης is, perhaps, significant. "The terminology οἵ. 


Sext. Emp. 8.18; 176.21; 176.23; 577.13; 9.20. 

App. i.366.63; i1.408.32; i.420.18; 1.62.70; 1.218.90; i.366.52. 
Verg. Aen. 6.851-3. 

Plut. ii. 102 Ὁ; ii. 1119C; i1.458C; 11.489; ii.551C. 


ea a ga ὦ 


30 


Aristotle’ is, in this connection, very important; we find the 
following scale: ὑπερβολήςξεξὀργιλότης, μεσότης---πραότης; ἔλλειψις--- 
ἀοργησίά, Aristotle says that πραότης is really not the word to 
express the mean, as its suggests weakness and inclines to 
the defect of ἀοργησία, or utter absence of anger or entire lack 
of spirit. Plutarch makes no such apology for πραότης, nor 
for μετριοπάθεα! While Plutarch’s μετριοπάθεια must have 
seemed to Aristotle as little, or perhaps even less a perfect 
virtue than his own πραότης, for Plutarch, the word and the 
virtue carried no similar reproach. ‘The weakness of μετριο- 
πάθεια did not strike him. It is plain that the ethical stan- 
dard has shifted. ‘There is a wide gap between Aristotelian 
and Plutarchean ethics. In Plutarch, the feeling for a 
‘‘mean”, for a control of the passions looking to an observa- 
tion of the ‘‘mean”, for the sake of the ‘‘mean’’, is not so 
strong as a control prompted by unselfish, altruistic motives. 
With such a different standard, the limits within which 
μετριοπάθεια could exercise itself, were, also, certain to change. 

Josephus’, like Appian, credits Romans with the posses- 
sion of μετριοπάθεια and it is mentioned with μεγαλοφροσύνη. 
Paul’s® high priest is able to perpwmabdivy,........ ἐπεὶ καὶ 
αὐτὸς περίκειται, ἀσθένειαν, Philo!® includes μετριοπάθεια, attributed 
to Aaron, Abraham and Joseph, among the virtues making 
for a noble character, in spite of the fact that he represents 
Moses, the perfect man, as turning his back upon μετριοπάθεια 
and cultivating ἀπάθεια instead; μετριοπάθεια, to the Hebraic 
mind, seemed rather a concession to human frailty. Diony- 
sius of Halicarnassus!! opposes μετριοπάθεια and a number of 
allied virtues, which do not go to make up avery strong 
character,—opposes these to the qualities of xpos and xaAerds, 
found in the nature of the Volsci. Aristeas!? mentions 
μετριοπάθεια, as part of the equipment of a philosopher. 

In Diogenes Laertius!? we find: ἔφη δὲ τὸν σοφὸν μὴ εἶναι μὲν 


7. Arist. Eth. N. 4.5.1 seq; Eth. N. 2.7.10; 7.4.a.23.1191625. Cf. also 
discussion of ἀνεξικακία͵ 
8. Jos. A. J. 12.3.2. 
9. N.T. Ep. Hebr. 5.2. 
10. Philo. i.113.44; 11.37.26: ii.45.38; i1.315.41; 11.439,2: i.113.31; i.113.2. 
11. Dion. H. 8. 61. 
12. Aristeas. 29. 
13. Diog. L. 5.31. 


31 


ἀπαθῆ, μετριοπαθῆ δέ, If Aristotle is quoted exactly, the word 
is an old one, of the Peripatetic school. If an old word, it is 
singular that we do not find it in Aristotle'*,—aye, even 
frequently. | 

While the idea of μετριοπάθεια was, doubtless, rooted in the 
Greek consciousness long before Plutarch’s day, just as it 
existed there, long afterwards, the word changed in mean- 
ing from the time of Aristeas to that of Sextus Empiricus. 
Most important for us is the fact that weakness is clearly 
and commonly conceived as an element in μετριοπάθεια͵ in the frst 
century A. D. ‘The word becomes a witness both for old 
forces and for new, a concession to the old idea of aesthetic 
repose and a confession of the new moral standard, testimony 
of an age that was externally influenced by the past but which 
was vitally affected by the present. 'The original aristocratic 
nature of μετριοπάθεια, was approaching the standard of the 
contemporary ταπεινοφροσύνη, which at once influenced the 
evolution and encouraged the practice of the former virtue. 

With the Plutarchean conception of μετριοπάθεια, the 
Greek mind was ready to entertain other virtues, as dveéixaxia, 
ἀγαθοποιΐα and κοινωφέλεια͵ 


> 
Ανεξικακία. 


While “humility”, because involving a sacrifice of pride, 
received only a reserved welcome from Plutarch, it doubtless 
affected the development of μετριοπάθεια. which, in the first 
century A. D., possessed a large degree of feebleness. 
Plutarch’s naive ignorance of this fact made his own recep- 
tion of this virtue the more possible. But no prejudice 
existed against the inherent weakness of dveétxaxia, which was 
accepted without hesitation by Plutarch. ‘This paradox is 
not entirely inexplicable; the relation of ἀνεξικακία to μετριοπά.. 
Gea is suggested by Plutarch, in the De Fraterno Amore, 
thus: μετριοπαθείας ἔκγονον ἀνεξικακίαν! . to the older virtue, natur- 
ally, there clung associations of the past, but no similar 


14, Aristotle was familiar with μετριότης, but μετριο- compounds 
are, in the main, of late origin. 


1. Plut. ii. 489 C. 


32 


mystery attached to the later word. Plutarch’s failure to 
recognize the changed character of μετριοπάθεια was as natural, 
as was his willingness to adopt ἀνεξικακία (a comparatively 
new sentiment), although it brought in its train implications 
that meant a break with the past and its traditions. 

The life of the word was very long; we find the term, 
first, in the Septuagint, then in the literature of the first 
century A. D. and shortly before, and, finally, as late as Por- 
phyrogenitus. A study of the literature in which the word 
occurs reveals the character and vitality of the virtue. 

Of the pagan attitude toward dveftxaxia we can form some 
idea from the testimony of several writers, flourishing imme- 
diately before and soon after Plutarch, and we get, too, sug- 
gestions of the practice of the virtue. Cicero’s? meditation 
upon ἀνεξία for a whole year was hardly without results, any 
more than Paul’s? exhortations to Timothy that δοῦλον δὲ κυρίου 
... δεῖν . , εἶναι πρὸς πάντας͵  ο dvegixaxov, ‘The virtue was well 
known to Epictetus*, who preaches of its valuable results, 
πραότης and dopynoia, Lwcian’s® approval of ἀνεξικακία is not 
altogether certain, but Herodianus® tones down a rather 
harsh picture of Severus, by attributing ἀνεξικακία and καρτερία 
to him. ‘The term occurs in Pollux’. Diogenes Laertius®, 
with admiration, describing Socrates’ endurance of ridicule, 
Says καί πάντα ταῦτα φέρειν ἀνεξικάκως͵ Themistius® defines the 
ἀνεξικακίάα of Sthenelus, by opposing to him—rév δὲ οὐ στέγοντα 
ὕβριν; no comment follows. 

Thus after Cicero, we find in Greek literature, outside of 
Plutarch, a decided appreciation of the virtue of ἀνεξικακία and 
signs that the virtue was cultivated. Its scope is not so 
clearly defined as in Plutarch, though it implies, at least, an 


Cic. Att. 5.11. 

N. T. Tim. ii. 2.24. 

Epict. Ench. 10. Arr. Epict. 3.20.9. 
Lucian: Judic. Voc. 9; Asin. 2; De. Par. 53. 
Hdn. 3.8. 

Poll. 5.138. 

Diog. 14. 221. 

Themist. 271 B. 


Ὁ φασι ΒΩ 


33 


endurance of abuse, a considerable humility and control of 
anger'®. 

The extent of Plutarch’s “‘forbearance” was remarkable, 
—overcoming τιμωρία, leading to acts of charity toward the 
feeble and even toward a foe, bringing about extreme mild- 
ness toward erring servants, and inducing the cultivation of 
dopynoia, φιλανθωπία, and freedom from harsh words and 
deeds'!. Plutarch speaks from personal experience, of the 
value of ἀνεξικακία whose present or existing force he recog- 
nizes, while exhorting still others to practice the virtue. 
Plutarch, as he had done in the case of μετριοπάθεια͵ constantly 
associates ἀνεξικακία with πραότης. in spite of his consciousness 
of its meekness, he takes refuge in the association of ἀνεξι- 
κακία with ἀνδρεία and with μεγαλοψυχία, on the hypothesis that 
weakness may be strength. Plutarch’s broad interpretation 
of ἀνεξικακία may, perhaps, have been far in advance of the 
average conception of the virtue,—but even this implies an 
actual exercise of ἀνεξικακία in the pagan world, though its 
scope may generally have been more limited. 

From the Septuagint!* with its approval of ἀνεξικακά and 
ἐπιείκεια to Porphyrogenitus!* who bears witness to the inclu- 
sion of this virtue in the body of Christian ideals, we have, 
in Ecclesiastic Greek, an important line of evidence touching 
the feeling entertained toward ἀνεξικακία by a large community 
of Greek speaking people, distributed over the entire pagan 
world. In Justin Martyr!4, ἀνεξικακία is not only strongly 
approved, but partially defined by reference to exhortations of 
Christ!®* and by association with ἀοργησία and ὑπομονή, Clemen- 
tin! ® refers to an incident of self-control in Peter’s life and the 


10. While we find such older terms as ἐγκράτεια, καρτερία, ἀοργησία͵ 
μειλιχία, etc., in the passages, cited above, yet dveixaxia, as under- 
stood in the first century A. D. and afterwards, was a virtue that hardly 
fitted into the older pagan world, and the ἀνεξικακί of Epictetus could 
hardly have corresponded to the virtue of the Homeric Greek, which 
Themistius calls ἀνεξικακία͵ 

11. Plut. ii. 90 E, 464 Ο, 489C, i. 220 EB, i. 290 F, ii. 459 C. 

12. LXX. Sap. 2.19. 

13. Porph. Cer. i.62. 16; 574.7. 

14. Just. M. Apol. i.16. 

15. N. T. Matth. 5. 39.40; Luc. 6.29. 

16. Clementin. 448 A. 


34 


high approval of that conduct, described by means οἱ μεγάλως 
and ἀνεξικάκως, Basilius’” counts ἀνεξικακία as part of εὐσέβεια to 
be exercised toward all. Macarius’!*® advice to bear misfor- 
tune with ἀνεξικακίά and μακροθυμία was to his mind no more 
impossible, than was the extraordinary conduct of Constan- 
tine which Eusebius!® calls φιλανθρωπίας ὑπερβολή. 

The evidence drawn from this source, covering a wide 
period of time and extending over a great reach of territory, 
demonstrates the unreserved practice of ἀνεξικακίά on the part 
of those to whom Judaism and Christianity appealed. The 
practice of this virtue involved a degree of patience, of 
humility, of weakness and meekness, submission to misfor- 
tune, of philanthropy,—with complete suppression of pride, 
which only piety and religious zeal could have inspired.?°® 

In the matter of “forbearance”, then, Plutarch occupied 
a middle ground, between the position taken by most pagan 
Greeks of the first and second centuries A. D., on the one 
hand, and that of the Christians of the same period and 
later. If Plutarch was not ready to make concessions that 
seemed necessary and noble to Christians, he was, neverthe- 
less, ahead of his age in generosity. The essential weakness 
of μετριοπάθεια reappears in its offspring virtue of ἀνεξικακία. but 
in the case of the latter virtue, Plutarch is more aware 
of that lack of strength than in the case of the former. 
Progressus in ἀνεξικακία was, significantly enough, accom- 
panied by a development of ἀοργησία, which, a ‘‘defect” in 
Aristotle, is highly praised by Plutarch, though an amiable 
weakness. If able to embrace the virtue of dvefixaxia, as in- 
terpreted by Plutarch, the old Greek pride was .broken, his 
character was tempered and humbled; it meant a new toler- 
ance, which was sure to destroy the old idea of τιμωρία and to 
be of the utmost consequence to slaves. ‘The inherent possi- 
bilities of the Plutarchean ἀνεξικακία appear, however, in their 


17. Basil. iv. 460.B. 

18. Macar. 233 Ὁ. 

19. Eus. ii. 989 C. 

20. We find in the passages (14-19) such older words as μακροθυμία, 
ἐπιείκεια, ἀοργησία, ὑπομόνή, mpadrns—all of which, whatever their his- 
tory, eventually helped to make ἀνεξικακία possible. 


35 


bloom, only later, in the ecclesiastical literature. The pos- 
sible effects of ἀνεξικακία were far-reaching. ‘The record of 
the actual effects of ἀνεξικακία in Plutarch’s day indicates the 
great circle of its activity, the numerous directions in which 
it was affecting Greek Ethics and Greek Life. 


᾿Αγαθοποιΐα. 


While the weakness of μετριοπάθεια was veiled, no similar 
doubt existed about ἀνεξικακία, ‘The presence of both these 
virtues was essential to the development of dya8oroia, ‘The 
passive character of ἀνεξικακία igs supplemented by the more 
positive or active nature of éyaforoiu, The ultimate effect of 
the three virtues would, necessarily, be—first, the suppression 
of the pride that rendered ταπεινοφροσύνη in Plutarch’s day, still 
foreign; second, the gradual naturalization of “‘humility” 

The concept of which the word ἀγαθοποιΐα ig an expres-. 
sion!, existed in the Greek mind as far back as the time of 
the Septuagint; it does not appear with any frequency, how- 
ever, until the first century A. D.; we find the word 
employed, in Plutarch, in the N. T., and, commonly, in 
Patristic Literature. 

In the Septuagint’, ἀγαθοποιΐα is predicated, primarily, of 
God, but also of man and, with certain qualifications, of 
woman besides. It is a divine quality, existing, potentially, 
in man, and also actually exhibited in acts of generosity and 
in filial piety. 

Plutarch® says Osiris has been called ὃ ἀγαθοποιός͵ In the 
New Testament*, we find the term frequently, and Christ is 


1, There were, to be sure, numerous words in the earlier language, 
aipeitying benefaction, ΚΙΗΡΉΦΝΝ, good-will, as εὐεργεσία, εὔνοια, φίλανθ.-.. 
ρωπία͵ ὠφέλιμος, προσηνής, ἀγαθοεργία, φιλάγαθος͵ etc. But the great 
majority of ἀγαθο. compounds are late, and this, of itself, is, perhaps, 
a sign of a certain moral agitation. Besides, it is the character of 
ἀγαθοποιΐα that is of chief importance to this discussion. 

2. LXX. Num. 10.32, Tobit. 12.13. Sophon. 1.12. Macc. i.11.33, 
Sir. 42.14. 

3. Plut. ii. 368B. 

4. N. T. Marc. 3.4; Luc. 6.33; Petr. i.2.15; 1.4.19; 1.3.6; i.3.17; Act. 
14.17; Petr. i.2.20; Joann. 3.11. Epist. 


36 


represented as the chief inspiration of the ἀγαθοποιοί, who 
approach the Christ-like, by the exercise of this virtue. 
Practically no limits are set for the practice of the virtue, 
ἀγαθοποιΐα, whose benefits should be universal! In Artem- 
idorus®, Ptolemaeus® and Hermes’, the word is used only in 
an astronomical sense of the stars and of the planets. 
Sextus Empiricus® gives clear expression to the religious tone 
of ἀγαθοποιΐα, in the following: ἀγαθοῦ ἴδιόν ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθοποιεῖν͵ 
τἀγαθὸν δὲ γε ὃ θεός͵ ἴδιον ἄρα ἐστὶ θεοῦ τὸ ἀγαθοποιεῖν͵ 

In the Ecclesiastical literature we receive confirmation 
of the suggestions that have appeared elsewhere. Clemens 
Romanus’, in an epistle to the Corinthians, establishes the 
divine origin of ἀγαθοποιΐα and its cosmopolitan character; the 
degree of piety it involves is almost more than human. 
Athenagoras’!® language could hardly be called equivocal: 6 
δὲ θεὸς τελείως ἀγαθὸς dy didiws ἀγαθοποιός éotw, Hermas!! throws 
further light on the position of the ἀγαθοποιός in life, whose 
virtues include πίστις, ἀλήθεια, ὑπομονή, τὸ χήρας ὑπηρετεῖν and 
pirogevia, The ‘‘Testamenta Patriarcharum”!? and Diog- 
netus'* simply re-affirm the position of Clemens Romanus, 
while Clenleus Alexandrinus!* defines the ἀγαθοποιΐα of the 
perfect man, who submerges his own interests in the greater 
benefits of all others. Clemens Alexandrinus, Paulus Alex- 
andrinus'® and Eusebius!® use the term, also, in an astrono- 
mical sense, of the stars. Iamblichus’!” statement is another 
predication of this virtue, of the gods. 


5. Artem. 4.59. 

6. Ptol. Tetrab. 38, 19.48; Bibl. i.19. 
7. Hermes Tr. Iatrom. 388.10. 

8. Sext. Emp. M. ii. 70. 

9. Clem. R. 2.10; 1.2; 1.344. 
10. Athenag. 952A. 

11. Hermas, Mand. 8; Vis. 3.9. 
12. Patriarch. 1137 C. 

13. Diognet. 1176 A. 

14. Clem. Al. i. 1348 A. 692 (6, (ii. 460A. θεός.) 
15. Paul. Al. iv. init. 
16. EKus. P. E. 275 Ὁ. 
17. Iambl. 52.18. 


37 


The governing motive of ἀγαθοποιΐα is not far to seek; its 
religious character is very pronounced! ‘The unrestricted 
limits within which we find the activity, implied in ayaorovia, 
exercised, is, also, most important, as it clearly indicates the 
breadth of the sympathy of the age that first brought the idea 
prominently forward in literature,—which means, in life. 
The sacrifice, necessary for dveéixaxia, grows apace with the 
development of ἀγαθοποιΐα. but that sacrifice was a possibility 
through the religious impulse back of it. 

While the evidence drawn from Plutarch himself is 
slight, that obtained from other sources renders clearer to 
our minds the possible and the probable status of ἀγαθοποιΐα 
for Plutarch and his age. ‘These side lights establish the 
same impression that our previous study of ταπεινοφροσύνη, 
μετριοπάθεια and ἀνεξικακία has created. ‘The four virtues are so 
closely involved that it is almost impossible to dissociate 
them; contemporaneous, in fact, they must have acted upon 
one another, withal that each had its own special functions. 
It is not impossible to conceive of ἀγαθοποιΐα! 8 as the crown of 
them all, pledge and product of their sincerity. 


Kowwdedia’ and Meyadwdedys. 


Κοινωφελής and μεγαλωφελής are clearly closely related. We 
find both of the words, for the first time, in literature of the 
first century A. D. or shortly before. Each activity was, 
plainly, a possibility in the atmosphere, created by the earlier 
feelings implied by ταπεινοφροσύνη, μετριοπάθεια͵ ἀνεξικακία and 
ayaboroia, ‘The mood following upon the cultivation of such 
virtues was hardly averse to κοινωφελία and μεγαλωφελία,͵ How 
far that mood expressed itself in action is a problem that a 
study of xowwdedia and of μεγαλωφελία will in part, as least, 
clarify. 


18. Itis, perhaps, singular that ἀγαθοποιΐα is of late origin, when 
we find ἀγαθοεργιία in Herodotus, κακοποιός in Pindar, and κακουργία 
in Homer. 

1. κοινωφελία is the form recognized by the ‘‘Etymologicum Mag- 
num ’’, 462.21, although κοινωφέλεια appears in Diodorus. 


38 


Plutarch’s? definition of the ᾿ρογίοος " man is signi- 
ficant,—viz., one who has combined political power with the 
calm life of the philosopher, having thus gained the two 
greatest blessings, the peace of the philosopher’s retirement 
and τοῦ. κοινωφελοῦς βίου of those engaged in political 
affairs. ‘There is no suggestion in the essay that Plutarch 
had in mind the life only of a narrow πολιτεία and there can 
be little doubt but that his vision was much broader. ‘There 
can be no question about the meaning of Philo’s*® phrase: 
κοινωφελεῖς yap ai τοῦ πρώτου ἡγεμόνος δωρεαί, The same broad 
interpretation applies (1) to his statement of a dogma which 
he calls κοινωφελέστατον,͵ ὅτι πᾶς δημιουργὸς ἡδονῆς σοφίας ἐστὶν ἄγονος, 
and (2) to his characterization of Joseph’s upright states- 
manship and judgment as xowwdercis, Perhaps one could 
hardly speak dogmatically of the true meaning of κοινωφελής, 
as applied by Plutarch to Antigonus, successor of Alexander. 
Diodorus Siculus* clearly limits the possible κοινωφέλεια of 
great monuments, to the inhabitants of Egypt. Marcus 
Aurelius® counts among his other virtues of mildness, of 
perseverance, of freedom from vain conceit, of love of toil,— 
also, willingness to pay heed to those who were able to 
produce τί κοινωφελές; for him, this is of world-wide import. 
Galen® speaks of medical services of ‘““common utility” toa 
Cretan city. Clemens Romanus’ attributes to the Lord ζητεῖν 
τὸ κοινωφελὲς πᾶσιν, which is in proportion to his ‘‘humility”. 

At first blush we would incline to a belief in a growth of 
wide philanthropy, previously fostered by such sentiments as 
ταπεινοφροσύνη, μετριοπάθεια͵ ἀνεξικακία and ἀγαθοποιΐα, and expressed 
by κοινωφελᾷ, Whether the wide philanthropy of κοινωφελία 
was largely a fancy or real fact of extended application is 
partially determined by the passages in which this word 
occurs. ‘The idea, strong enough to seek embodiment in a 
new term, was actually vzta/ enough to serve as a factor in 
life,—well known to Galen and to Marcus Aurelius and 


Plut. i. 258 Εἰ; ii. 8A. 

Philo. i.389.28; 11.52.19: 11.404: 11.376, 
Diod. 1.51. 

Anton. 1.16. 

Galen. 14.296. 

Clem. R. i.48. 


IDK PWN 


39 


clearly implied by Philo, Diodorus and Plutarch! The word 
expresses not merely a passive sense of equality, a widening 
humanity, but also an active interest in affairs. 

While such sentiments are, necessarily, always, to some 
extent zdeal, yet the consideration and contemplation and © 
welcoming of that ideal, in time, at least in part, establishes 
that ideal more and more a dynamic working force in actual 
life. ‘The operative power of such a δύναμις may or may not 
be able to create its own perfect ἐντελέχεια, but the fact of the 
δύναμις none would deny. 

The fact of weakness, pre-supposed by the other virtues 
of μετριοπάθεια and ἀνεξικακία, would operate against the com- 
plete success of κοινωφελία and we find little to justify the 
belief in a vigorous activity looking toward a universal 
amelioration. ὃ : 

While still, then, to a degree, ideal (perhaps the Greek 
temperament could never realize such an ideal )—xowwdperia 
was, nevertheless, not an impossibility to the imagination of 
the first century A. D.! The Macedonian conquest had 
broken down the barriers between Greek and barbarian; the 
Stoic philosophy had proclaimed the equality of all men; 
the Roman conquest*® had still further reduced the Greek 
people. Under these circumstances, the cosmopolitan and 
religious character of xowwdedia (as of ἀγαθοποιΐα) is a matter 
of little surprise. [The broad political values of Plutarch 
and the religious of Philo are both of unzversal application 
to all mankind? ! 


8. See ‘Historical Introduction.”’ 

9. Κοινωφελής was formed, perhaps, after analogy of the older 
δημωφελής͵ While κοινωνία and εὐεργέτης are earlier terms, κοινο-ποιέω͵ 
-πραγία and -παθής are of comparatively late origin. 


Μεγαλωφελής ,— What has been said of κοινωφελής is largely true of 
this word, also, and little need be added. 

Μεγαλωφελία was at least a possibility (as has been said of κοινω- 
φελία), though the passages in which this word occurs give but a nega- 
tive result. 

The passages, Plut. ii. 553D; Cleomed. i.15; Clem. A. i.352B., do 
not demonstrate the actuality of the virtue that μεγαλωφελής implies; 
they do not prove that the virtue was really practiced. But it is difficult 
to conceive of an utter neglect of what μεγαλωφελία stands for, when 
men were applying the term to God, to Nature, and to heroes of the 
past, with admiration. 


40 


Μεγαλοεργία. 


Μεγαλοεργία, though found in Polybius, occurs with com- 
parative frequency only in the time of Plutarch and after. 
Throughout the analysis that follows, we shall find a strik- 
ing avoidance of assigning the quality of μεγαλοεργία to con- 
temporary actors or events, and a consistent attribution of it 
to men and deeds, remote in time and place, to Nature and 
to God. , 

Polybius! informs us that Antiochus and Aemilius Paulus 
were rivals in ‘‘magnificence”. Philo? with admiration, 
looks back to the time of Moses for his examples of μεγαλο- 
vpyia, Josephus® applies the term to a place of uncommon 
splendor, in Phoenicia. Plutarch* predicates the quality of 
Alexander the Great, of Demetrius, of the Athens of Per- 
icles’ day, of Cato Major and of the Roman consul Caninius 
Rebilus,—always with approval. Plutarch’s testimony to 
the confusion of ὠμότης and μεγαλουργία in his own time, is 
witness to a perverted moral judgment and proof of the 
absence rather than of the presence of the second of the two 
qualities. Lucian® attributes τὸ μεγαλουργόν to Alexander, to- 
gether with 76 μηδὲν μικρὸν ἐπινοεῖν͵ Appian®, too, turns to the 
past and finds μεγαλοεργία in the character of Ptolemy Phila- 
delphus, of Mithridates, of Hannibal, of Scipio, of Pompey 
the Great, and their is no question of his admiration for the 


The potentiality, at least, was there in Plutarch’s day and this was 
so strong—as the coinage of the term indicates and as the unreserved 
admiration of the virtue shows—that it is quite within the bounds of 
possibility and of probability that the potentiality of which we have 
evidence, was an actuality, at least a striving to perform great services. 
μεγαλο- compounds are numerous in the earlier literature, 6. g. μεγαλο- 
γνώμων, -δοξος, -δωρος, -xivduvos, -νοια, πράγμων, -rperns, σθενής, -φρων, 
ψυχος, μεγαλήγορος, μεγαλήνωρ, μεγαλανχία: —comparatively late are 
peyado-epyia, -πάθεια, -ποιέω, μεγαλωσύνη. But there are a number of 
significant late pixpo- compounds! 

1. Polyb. 31.3.1. 

2. Philo. ii. 142; i. 405.26; ii. 21.46; ii. 105.16. 

3. Jos. Ant. 15.9.6. 

4. Plut. Caes. 58, (i. 735A), i. 191D; i. 344B; i. 705A; i. 897 Ὁ; ii. 
183B; ii. 456F. 

5. Luc. Alex. 4; Calumn. 17. 

6. App. i. 14.7; i. 816.42; ii. 6.86; ii. 155.19; ii. 235.22; ii. 270.16. 


41 


quality of μεγαλοεργία, Philostratus’ uses the term to describe 
a natural situation, and in reflecting upon the deeds of 
Xerxes, of Darius and of Agamemnon. Eusebius’® complaint 
that men, wondering at the marvels of architecture, forget 
the architect, as those, marvelling at God’s work, neglect his 
worship,—is not far removed from Nectar’s® religious enthu- 
siasm and ascription of μεγαλοεργίά, to God, who thereby 
reveals the greatness of his goodness. 

While the idea of the activity, expressed by the word, 
was present to the mind of the Greeks who coined and 
employed the term, there is no evidence from the literature 
in which the word occurs, that the activity itself was 
present’® for the same period. On the contrary, there is 
constant reference either to the great figures of the past - 
history of the pagan world or to the supernatural, with full 
admiration for the virtues of μεγαλοεργίά, Just as far as the 
Greek world coined and employed this word with reference to 
great events abroad and far away, the term becomes a strange 
satire on the Greek’s own insignificance in certain of the 
great activities of the world. The word and its usage be- 
tray the essential weakness of the people that proceeded no 
farther than a neologism,—however strong their ambition to 
imitate might have been or however great their passive 
indifference and indecision might have been. ‘The wide cur- 
rency of the term is important, as it shows the extent of the 
_ mental state that thus expressed itself,—whether incipient 
energy, that, however, never attained to effective action, or 
whether a mere passive regard for the accomplishments of 
others was responsible for the coinage of the term. 

In either event, in time, a sense of weakness was bound 
to prevail, sooner or later, among the people whose own 
μεγαλοεργία was of a phantom nature! Such a sense of feeble- 
ness inevitably bred melancholy. 

Though there was a spark of the old pride!! in him still, 


7. Philostr. 2. 221.3 and 9. 

8. Eus. ii. 1380 B. 

9. Nectar 1825 A. (cf. also Simoc. 5.2). 

10. κενοδοξία and κενοσπουδία (treated later) were existing evils. 


14) ae. ταπεινοφροσύνη, treated earlier. 


42 


nevertheless the Greek’s generally weak ομαγαοίογ' ἡ accounts 
for the passive nature of μεγαλοεργία, an expression not of real 
‘“magnificence”, but rather of pseudo-greatness in many 
repects!*®. The growing consciousness of the latter fact 
reacted, doubtless, upon the resignation essential to the full 
development of those other virtues, ταπεινοφροσύνη, μετριοπάθεια 
and ἀνεξικακίαϊ 4, 


Κενοδοξία. 


Out of the list of very many xevo- compounds, we have 
chosen xevodogia and κενοσπουδία as particularly significant. 
The importance of these ideas to the morality of the age 
under consideration is obvious’. 

The term κενοδοξία is found in the Septuagint and in 
Aristeas and in Polybius, but appears much more frequently 
in and after the first century A. D.! There is no ambiguity 
about the meaning of the word, no question about the exist- 
ence of “frivolity” and ‘‘conceit’’, no doubt about the feeling 
entertained toward these. 

From the testimony of the Septuagint? that idols have 
come into the world through the κενοδοξία of men (frivolous- 
mindedness), to that of Aristeas* that the tastes of the 
κενόδοξοι are inferior, we pass to Polybius* who not only con- 


12. As shown by our study of μετριοπάθεια, ἀνεξικακία, ἀγαθοποιία. 
we do not mean moral weakness. 

13. Even in the direction of κοινωφελία, which might have been 
fully realized, if μεγαλοεργία had been genuine. 

14. The μεγαλο.-: compounds in the older literature, whether of mind, 
of soul, courage, labor, speech, reputation or generosity, are numerous: 
μεγαλός-θυμος, -γνώμων͵ -dd0f0s, -ddwpos, -dvoia, -πόνηρος, -πράγμων, 
-πρέπεια͵ -σχήμων, -Ppovéw, -ψυχία, μεγαληγορία, μεγαληνορία͵ μεγα- 
λοεργία represents no new concept, but a return in thought (cf. also 
μεγαλοποιέω) to the past, glowing with great deeds. 

1. Κενόφρων, κενολογέω, κενότης (and also μικρολογία) are terms 
found in the older literature, as well as a number of other xeyo- com- 
pounds, less important. ‘The idea of κενοδοξία is not an altogether new 
one, but the frequent use of the word in later literature gives it great 
significance. 

2. LXX. Sap. 14.14. 

3. Aristeas 2. 

4. Polyb. 3.81.9; 27.6.12; 10.33.6; 39.1.1. 


43 


demns Hasdrubal, the Carthaginians, Polyaratus for κενοδοξία 
which he associated with other evils as ἀλαζονεία and drepia, — 
but also, through Hannibal, complains that προπέτεια, θρασύτης͵ 
θυμός ἄλογος͵ κενοδοξία and τῦφος incline to ἐπιβουλὴ, ἐνέδρα and 
ἀπάτη. 

Diodorus Siculus® tells the tale of the death of Calanus, 
an Indian philosopher, contemporary of Alexander, whose 
spectacular death some condemned as an exhibition of κενοδοξία, 
‘‘vanity”. Paul® writes to the Philippians and to the Gala- 
tians against ‘‘ vain-glory”, exhorting ‘‘lowliness of mind”; 
his sermon was, of course, inspired by fear that the evils 
existed. The previous impressions are confirmed by the 
evidence of Plutarch? who regretfully complains of the 
anger of the covetous man, the glutton, the jealous man, the 
κενόδοξος, whose examples he laments, as well as that of the 
flatterer who is not ashamed to call ‘‘ambition”, “‘ fruitless 
vanity”. Philo® dramatically represents κενοδοξία as a wild 
beast, lying in wait to destroy those who engage in it, and it 
is the δημοκόπος who is the κενόδοξος, Further, κενοδοξία is 
included in a category of other social evils, presumably con- 
temporaneous. ὃ κενόδοξος was a fact in the life of Marcus 
Aurelius®, who scorns such a one and his “‘little glory”, 
δοξάριον. According to Arrian!® and Epictetus, the law takes 
cognizance of the κενόδοξος who is set down with the ἀλαζών, 
Lucian!! humorously represents Hermes as begging Zeus to 
lay aside ἀλαζονεία, ἀμαθία, xevodogia, τῦφος, ματαιοπονία, μικρολογία, 
ὀργή and many other faults. Porphyrius’* attributes the 
κενοδοξία of the men of his own day, source of great misfor- 
tunes, to the enmity of demons. We find the term as late as 
Heliodorus!*, applied to the Kgyptians. 

The Ecclesiastical literature tells much the same tale 


5. Diod. Sic. 17.107.5. 
6. N.T. Ep. Phil. 2.3; Ep. Gal. 5.26. 
7. Plut. ii.57D; ii.457B. 
8. Philo. i.613.11; i.401.19; 11.47.16: ii.376.44. 
9, M. Anton. 5.1. 

10. Arr. Epict. 3.24.43. 

11. Lue. D. Mort. 10.8. 

12. Porph. Abst. ii.40. 

13. Heliod. 9.19. 


44 


regarding this word κενοδοξία, Polycarp'* had said to the 
Roman proconsul, with scorn, εἰ xevodogeis, Clemens Romanus! 
in a letter to the Corinthians promises them salvation, if 
they cast off injustice, strife, malice, slander, pride, ‘‘vain- 
glory”. Ignatius!® betrays his aversion to κενοδοξία, by prais- 
ing those who have in place of it, love of the Lord. Inthe 
language of the Tatian'’ the same feeling exists. Euse- 
bius!® ridicules a certain Lacydas for his κενοδοξία, while, fin- 
ally, in Chrysostomus’® we read: 6 γάρ τεταπεινωμένος καὶ 
συντετριμμένος οὐ κενοδοξήσει, οὐκ ὀργιεῖται͵ οὐ φθονῆσει τῷ πλησίον͵ οὐκ 
ἄλλο τι δέξεται πάθος͵ which, open to but one interpretation, 
brings the same conviction that the previous testimonies 
have created. 

We have, thus, abundant evidence of the long-continued, 
wide-spread evil of κενοδοξία, which, signifying, now, “‘ friv- 
olity”, now, ‘‘conceit”, meaning frivolous-mindedness, 
vanity, vain-glory—is combated as an existing evil! not only 
in the Plutarchean age (when the κενόδοξος was a well-known 
type of the day), but before and after that time as well, an 
evil deep-rooted in the character of the Greek of the first 
century A. D.! 

Such a mental state implies a loss of greater or more 
serious interests. It is astate of mind that belongs to men 
of lesser intellectual stature; it is significantly enough but 
once applied to a Roman, and then, hypothetically. 

With its signification of “‘frivolity”, its effect on politics 
is obvious; meaning also ‘‘conceit”, its influence in the realm 
of ethics upon the new ethical standard would be equally 
deleterious. It was an excess, doubtless, of κενοδοξία that pro- 
voked the opposition to it that we have noted; that very 
excess carried with it the possibility of a cure and might in 
time inspire the opposite virtue of real modesty which the 
Christian Fathers exhorted. 

As long, however, as κενοδοξία flourished, there was little 


14. Polyc. 10. 

15. Clem. R. i.35. 

16. Ignat. 697 A.B. 

17. Tatian. 832B. 

18. Eus. (Numen. apud) iii.1209A. 
19. Joan. Chrys. vii. 43 A. 


45 


‘ 


hope for ταπεινοφροσύνη, and the evil of κενοδοξία, “‘conceit”’, 
without doubt, was one of the forces that interfered with the 
development of ταπεινοφροσύνη ,͵ 'The weakness of ‘“‘friv- 
olity” (κενοδοξία) co-operated with that of μετριοπάθεια and of 
ἀνεξικακία͵ and helps to explain the negative element in ἀγαθοποιΐα 
and the negative nature of μεγαλοεργία, while the ‘‘vanity” of 
κενοδοξία would prevent the state of equality essential for a 
Utopian κοινωφελώ, 

Vanity, pride, conceit?! were, as every one knows, essen- 
tial qualities of the pagan world. But the Greek world had 
not, before this, reached the point where it could pronounce 
that judgment upon itself, which we read in the word 
κενοδοξία itself, and hear proclaimed in literature from Polybius 
to Heliodorus. The study of κενοδοξία admirably shows the 
position of the Greek of the first century A. D., who is still 
Greek, to the extent that he is ‘“‘vain’’, κενόδοξος, but un-Greek, 
in that he condemns that pride and holds it sinful or 
** frivolous”. 

Here we find (as in μεγαλοεργία) the possible genesis of a 


melancholy, which manifests itself more pronouncedly in 
κενοσπουδία͵ 


Περιαυτολογία, 


Let us subordinate περιαυτολογία to κενοδοξία, to which it is very 
closely related. 

The word περιαυτολογία appears for the first time in Plutarch. The 
quality of ‘‘boastfullness’’ that it refers to, is one that existed long 
before Plutarch and one for which there were many other expressions. 
(μεγαλαυχία, peyadynyopta, κομπάζω, κομπέω, ὑψηλολογέομαι, σεμνογογέω, 
καυχάω͵ στωμυλία, στομφασμός͵ adxyéw, ἀπειλέω͵ ἀλαζονεύομαι: this is a 
partial list of the earlier terms denoting “‘boasting’’. In view of these 
many terms, the appearance of περιαυτολογία is all the more remark- 
able.) ‘The coinage of this new term and, no less, the continuance, in 
use, of the group of older terms, evince the persistence of certain 


20. Cf. previous study of ταπεινοφροσύνη. 

21. We need but to recall χαυνότης, ματαιότης, ἀγλαΐα, μεγαληνορία, 
αὐθαδία͵ ὄγκος, μεγαλοφροσύνη, τῦφος and δοκησισοφία, The following 
from Aristotle (Eth. N. 2.7.7) expresses clearly the old artistic standard 
of judgment and the consequent grounds of objection: περὶ δὲ τιμὴν καὶ 
ἀτιμίαν μεσότης μὲν μεγαλοψυχία, ὑπερβολὴ δὲ χαυνότης Tis λεγομένη, 
ἔλλειψις δὲ μικροψυχία, 


46 


features of Greek character, certain qualities that were a heritage of the 
past (cf. also ταπεινοφροσύνη discussion) and which were not easily 
surrendered! (The vitality of the term is of much significance and is 
such as to dispel any suspicion that,—because the cases of occurrence 
of the term are rather infrequent—the quality was of little consequence 
in life.) . 

Plutarch’s (Plut. ii. 29B; ii. 41C; ii. 539C) condemnation of 
περιαυτολογία is expressed in no uncertain terms; together with peyar- 
avxia, it is contrasted with drudia and μετριότης. it is characterized as 
ἐταχθές and ἀνελεύθερον and the moralist adds: ἔργῳ δ᾽ οὐ πολλοὶ τὴν ἀηδίαν 
αὐτοῦ διαπεφεύγασιν, Sextus Empiricus (Sext. Emp. πὶ Y, i. 62.) mocks 
the dog matists whom he criticizes as τετυφωμένων καὶ περιαυτολο γούντων. 
Iamblichus (Iambl. 91.8; Myst. 90.9) stigmatizes περιαυτολογία͵ calling it 
τὸ ἀπατηλόν, Porphyrius, (Porphyr. Aneb. 32.12) claiming that τὸ 
περιαυτολογεῖν was common to gods, demons and other superior beings, 
and was token of the god’s presence, is contradicted by Iamblichus, 
who grants them truth, instead of ‘“‘boasting’’. Origen’s (Origen. i. 
752B) words are significant: ἐνιδεῖν δὲ ἔστι καὶ τῷ τοῦ Ἰησοῦ ἤθει πανταχοῦ 
περιϊσταμένον τὴν περιαυτολογίαν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο λέγοντος: ᾿᾿Κἂν ἐγὼ εἴπω 
περὶ ἐμαυτοῦ, ἡ μαρτυρία μου οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθής," EHustathius (Eust. 100. 
37; 897.2) describing Nestor, says, without disapproval, τοιοῦτος οὖν ὃ 
Νέστωρ ὧν πολλαχοῦ περιαυτολογεῖ͵ While, in another passage, interpreting 
Homer, his language is as follows: ἱστέον δὲ καὶ ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ ἐνταῦθα κυριο- 
λεκτουμένου κομπεῖν τὸ κομπάζειν παρῆκται, ὃ παρὰ τοῖς ὕστερον͵ στωμυλώιν 
δηλοῖ καὶ στομφασμὸν περιαυτολογικόν. 

The word is an expression of one side of the Greek’s nature, the 
other side of which is represented by such terms as ταπεινοφροσύνη and 
dveEixaxia, But just as far as κενοδοξία, interrupted the progress of 
ταπεινοφροσύνη and ἀνεξικακία, 50, too, the presence of περιαυτολογία 


militated against “‘humility”’ and ‘‘forbearance’’, and along with these, 
against the “‘quality of mercy’’, included in xowwdedrXia, At the same 


time, these virtues act against περιαυτολογία and seek to overcome it; 
the real vanity and inanity of the boasting strain for which περιαυτο. 
λογία stands is evidenced by the presence of κενοσπουδία and of 
ματαιοπονία | 

Περιαυτολογία͵ like κενοδοξία, is a companion term to peyadoepyia, 
and was justified as far as the latter term was an index of real accom- 
plishment, but become a hollow pretence, when we recognize the 
unreality of μεγαλοεργία͵ 

In a moral atmosphere, however, of which ταπεινοφροσύνη, μετριοτ- 
άθεια and ἀγαθοποιΐα are products, the quality of περιαυτολογία Was natur- 
ally condemned, and that condemnation and distrust, such as we find in 
Plutarch, led, perhaps, somewhat to its suppression,—though that very 
moral greatness would be the chief ground fora justifiable περιαυτολογία | 


47 


Πειθήνιος͵ 


[The suggestions derived from the passages in which πειθήνιος 
occurs, are not insignificant. 

Πειθήνιος (It is not our object, here, to determine, completely, the 
nature and the limits of ‘‘obedience’’ in Greek ethics. For this idea 
there were many expressions in the older language, as ὑπήκοος, 
χειροήθης, πειθαρχία͵ εὐπείθεια͵ ὑπακούω, ἀκρόασις, πεισιχάλινος, κατήκοος͵ 
πιθανός͵ εὐήνιος͵ εὐήκοος͵ Πειθήνιος may have been formed after analogy 
of πεισιχάλινος ΟΥ̓ πειθαρχί- what motive was behind the creation of 
this new term it were difficult to determine.) is another member of the 
new vocabulary of the first century A. D. and reveals considerable 
regarding the problem of ‘‘obedience’’. 

When Plutarch (Plut. ii. 592 B; ii. 90 B; ii. 442 C; ii. 102 F; ii. 369 
C; ii. 1029 Εἰ; i. 58D; i. 176 A; i. 596 C; i. 878 F.) refers to Roman or 
to Spartan life, ‘‘obedience’’ is explicitly represented as due to the 
authority of law and of administration; these instances are, perhaps, 
cited—as usual in Plutarch’s Lives—for emulation. Within the limits 
of Greek conduct, reason and divine power are in control and exact 
“‘obedience’’. Philo (Philo. i. 184.5.) also imagines reason as mistress 
of the soul, while to the mind of Clemens Alexandrinus (Cl. Al. i. 1012 B; 
ii. 460 A.) the supreme power is vested in God, whose example is fol- 
_ lowed in worldly affairs and to whom “‘obedience”’ is due. (We also find 
the term in M. Anton. (i. 17), who rejoiced in a wife, πειθήνιος and 
ircoropyos,—in Pollux (i. 219) who uses it in its strictly literal sense, 
—in Soranus (p. 220), who employs it in a medical way). 

The ideal subservience to reason, to Fate, to Daemons, to God, allow- 
ing much scope for individualism, does not deny the possibility of will- 
ing surrender; at the same time that περιαυτολογία and κενοδοξία found a 
place in men’s consciousness, ταπεινοφροσύνη (under certain conditions) 
was exercised and brotherly love was encouraged! The complex char- 
acter of this virtue meant a Greek appreciation of ‘‘obedience”’ that did 
not enslave but which allowed freedom at the moment of surrender. 

The complexity of such “‘obedience”’ is closely identified with the 
combined religious and rational tone of later Greek ethics. Conduct 
had at once an intellectual justification and sought a divine sanction! 
Freedom was not surrendered, nor was authority denied !] 


Kevoorrovoia. 


Out of the mental state implied by κενοδοξία, κενοσπουδία 
could and did result, and we find it, first, shortly before the 
first century B.C. The suspicion that the word itself is a 
symbol of a “‘zealous pursuit of frivolities” and of the ‘‘friv- 
olity of zeal’, in the life of the Greeks of the first century 
A.D., is confirmed by a study of the passages in which the 
term occurs; neither element of the word is new; but that 


48 


σπουδή should be so κενή as to form a single concept denotes ἃ 
fixity of the idea, and signifies more than mere occasional 
expressions of the futility of zeal and of labor; the single 
word is concrete evidence of the fact that the idea was 
abroad, while the wide and free use of the word would seem 
to indicate the actual importance of the feeling which the 
word defines; the literature betrays the regret felt because 
of the fact of xevorrovdia, a fact that pressed heavily upon the 
moral consciousness of the age. 

The word is variously applied to certain minor endeav- 
ors, to trivial events and tothe whole of human conduct. 
Cicero! refers to problems of idle curiosity touching events 
in Brundisium in the year 49 Β. C., as xevdorovda?, Dionysius 
of Halicarnassus® characterizes the laughable conduct of 
Lucius Junius Brutus (contemporary of Appius Claudius), 
as xevorrovdia, ΤῸ Josephus‘ the idea was not unknown and 
it was referred to the times of Herod. Plutarch’s® condem- 
nation of κενοσπουδίά grows out of the bitterness of his own 
experience; while it is unthinkable that God is μικρός and 
κενόσπουδος͵ men ave so and zealously fritter away their energy 
upon profitless things; 6 κενόσπουδος is opposed (and defined 
by the antithesis) to ὁ φιλόπονος, The same moral earnest- 
ness appears in Marcus Aurelius®, and his sweeping denun- 
ciation includes almost all of men’s activities, under the head 
of xevoorovdia! Hermas’’ scorn for the κενόσπουδος whom he 
knows from life, is paralleled by that of Artemidorus*, whose 
discrimination leads him into condemnation. Hipparchus® 
defines the “‘zealous frivolity” of a dilettant mathematician, 


1.. Cic. Att. 9,1. : 

2. It is not remarkable that Cicero knew this comparatively new 
term (cf. also ἀνεξικακία). Cicero knew his Greek! His knowledge of 
the term is not at all proof of its age, but rather of its wide currency,— 
perhaps wider than its comparatively infrequent appearance in litera- 
ture would suggest. 

Dion. H. 6.70. 

Jos. Ant. 16.4.3. 

Plut. ii. 560 B; ii. 1061 C; ii. 234 Ὁ; 1069 Ὁ. 
M. Anton. 4.32; 7.3. 

Herm. Sim. 9.5. 

Artemid. 4.11; 4,82. 

Hipparch. 1016 Β. 


Neat ga ret phat aie cat 


49 


by contrasting the seriousness of a φιλαλήθης with his κενοσ- 
movdia, ‘The pious enthusiasm of Clemens!® of Alexandria 


carries him into extravagant denials of the value of life apart 
from religion, and leads him to praise life in the desert ἐκτός 
πάσης κενοσπουδίας͵ ἀπειραγαθίας͵ μικροπρεπείας, Clemens Alexan- 
drinus could have sympathized with Plutarch and with 
Marcus Aurelius. Although Diogenes Laértius!! looks back 
to the time of Plato!’, his reproach does not belong dis- 
tinctly to that earlier age any more than his general reflec- 
tion; ὅσα συντείνει εἰς τὸ ἀβέβαιον καὶ κενόσπουδον ἅμα καὶ παιδαριῶδες 
τῶν ἀνθρώπων, which possesses a universal value. His associa- 
tion of κενοσπουδία with τῦφος is also suggestive. Finally, 
Stobaeus’® employs the word, expressing a thought he 
attributes to Socrates’*. 

After the passing of the conditions that created the 
social ethics of Plato, the aesthetic ethics of Aristotle, the 
individual ethics of Zeno and of Epicurus, a condition 
inevitably arose, in which κενοσπουδία was prominent! We 
wonder that we do not find the word earlier in literature. 
The growth of a futile or fr’volous zeal ended in an ultimate 
belief in the futility of all zeal! Kevoorovdia, the result of 
κενοδοξία, is the very antithesis of a genuine μεγαλοεργία, though 
a natural concomitant of a mythical peyadoepyia, Melancholy 
was a natural result of the regret, (that we have found 
evidence of) at the prevalence of xevoorovdia, We find a more 
distinctly marked pessimism in connection with κενοσπουδία 
than we have before. 

We find, to be sure, sporadic strains of melancholy in 
the earlier literature; but οἵη περ φύλλων γενεή, τοίη δὲ καὶ ἀνδρῶν͵ 
and ὁρῶ γὰρ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν ὄντας ἄλλο πλὴν εἴδωλ᾽ ὅσοιπερ ζῶμεν ἢ κούφην 
σκιάν, and other similar lines do not represent the prevailing 


10. Clem. Al. i. 532 B; i. 216 B. 

11. Diog. L. 6.26; 9.68. 

12. Diogenes Laértius is probably no more quoting exactly, here, 
than before, in the case of μετριοπάθεια͵ (Cf. previous treatment of 
that word.) 

13. Stob. 534.23. 

14. Σωκράτης ἔλεγε νομίζειν ἀεὶ τοὺς θεοὺς γελᾶν ὁρῶντας τὴν τῶν 
ἀνθρώπων κενοσπουδίαν͵ It is little likely, we think, that Socrates knew 
this word which we find, first, in Hipparchus and in Cicero. 


50 


spirit of the earlier age, nor is melancholy characteristic, 
in general, of the Greek nature, which,—active, boastful, 
talkative, fickle, not above lying, beauty-loving, speculative 
and brave,—was not pessimistic. We find no Lucretius, no 
Rubaiyat in Greek literature! The consciousness of the folly 
and futility and emptiness of human endeavor does, however, 
assert itself more strongly after the great conquests, and the 
presence of this word, under consideration, is no less a sign 
of that feeling than was the rise of a School of Skeptics | 
much earlier. But the Greek was not incurably pessimistic 
and even τῆς δὲ κακίας ἀναπέπλησται πάντα πράγματα καὶ πᾶς ὁ Bios 
εὐθὺς ἐκ παρόδου καὶ ἀρχῆς ἄχρι κορωνίδος ἀσχημονῶν καὶ ἐκπίπτων καὶ 
ταραττόμενος καὶ μηδὲν ἔχων μέρος καθαρὸν μηδ᾽ ἀνεπίληπτον, ὡς οὗτοι 
λέγουσι, (i.e. the Stoics) αἴσχιστόν ἐστι δραμάτων ἁπάντων καὶ ἀτερ- 
πέστατον: ὅ represents only one side of Stoicism, and even such 
strong condemnations provoked, in time, only a feeling of 
equality and of wider sympathy, but not of despair. Thes ad- 
ness of κενοσπουδία is, however, indisputable. 

Kevooroviia, involving τῦφος, the opposite of φιλόπονος and 
of φιλαλήθης, is, like κενοδοξία, twin-sister of pixpoepyia, and 
becomes a true expression of a petty age that worshiped 
μεγαλοεργία as a distant ideal! Pride, feebleness and sadness 
were conspicuous among the qualities of the Greek of 
Plutarch’s century ! 


Ματαιοπονία. 


We find ματαιο-, compounded with nouns of action! occa- 
sionally before the first century A. D.,—but such cases are 
sporadic in comparison with the numerous later occurrences. 

“Ματαιοπονία is applied to a wide range of activities, being 
even predicated, though negatively, of God and of Nature. 
Ματαιοπονία is by no means a new idea in Greek life, within 
which, from Homer’s time on, much πόνος or σπουδή must have 
seemed μάταιος, ‘The later interpretation of what constituted 
paraorovia is also quite a universal one, and Polybius and 
Livy, Strabo and Pheidias, Plutarch and Plato, Lucian and 
Homer might easily have been in agreement, touching the 


15. Plut. ii. 1066 A. (cf. too ii. 478 A. seq). 
1. We have taken into consideration, ματαιοπονία, -πὸόνημα, -πραγία, 
-σπουδία͵ -εργία͵ 


51 


{ 


folly of what is termed pataorovia, But as in the case of 
xevoorovdia, the later close association of ματαιο- with a con- 
siderable number of other ideas is significant; the words 
thus formed where not fashioned for a day, and suggest the 
growth of a feeling of ματαιότης ! 

Polybius*? records his own keen disapproval of pataorovia, 
as wellas that of the Romans. The scholiasts* of Aristophanes 
and of Sophocles used the term paraorovew to define less well- 
known words from their authors; θορυβεῖν and κοῦφα λαλεῖν, also 
employed to illuminate the same text, at the same time also 
explain the commentator’s attitude toward an existing 
paraorovia, Strabo* finds an example of ματαιοπονία, in the 
case of an Egyptian temple of barbaric κατασκευή, which, to 
his mind, possessed little of grace. Philo® denies that the 
quality of ματαιοπονία can be predicated either of Nature or of 
God. His conception of paraorovia ig graphically stated: 
νηπίων maidwv ,, , οἷ πολλάκις παρ᾽ αἰγιαλοῖς ἀθύροντες ψάμμου γεωλόφους 
διανιστᾶσι καὶ ἔπειθ᾽ ὑφαιροῦντες Taisxepol πάλιν ἐρείπουσι, Plutarch® 
expresses his own conviction, in applying the term ματαιοπονία 
to useless indulgence in grief. The satirist Lucian’ includes 
ματαιοπονία among ἀλαζονεία, ἀμαθία, ἔρις, κενοδοξία, μικρολογία and 
other no less censurable evils, unworthy of the gods. 
Iamblichus® represents Pythagoras as characterizing the 
ordinary duties of life that interfere with philosophy, as 
ματαιοπόνημα, ΤῸ Clemens Romanus?®, ματαιοπονία consisted in 
idle inquiry regarding the future of the soul. Justin’s!® 
hypothetical statement of the ματαιοπονία of God is, of course, 
an expression of his own condemnation of that quality in 
life. Olympiodorus’!! opinion of ματαιοσπουδία is shown by his 
association and identification of it with τὰ ἀνύπαρκτα τῶν ὀνείρων 
φαυτάρματα and τὴν τῶν πολλῶν λόγων ἄκαιρον φλυαρίαν, Eypiphan- 


Polyb. 9.2.2; 25.3.11. 

Schol. Ar. Plutus. 575; Soph. O. T. 887. 
Strabo. 806. : 
Philo. 2.500; 2.98.52. 

Plut. ii. 119 D. 

Luc. Dial. Mort. 10.8. 

Iambl. Vita Pyth. 24. 

Clementina. i. 60 B; i. 27. B. 

Just. Frag. 1585 A. 

Olymp. A. 541 C. 


Ὁ ον δι σι» ΘΟ 


mr 
— © 


52 


—- vo - e 


ins’!* condemnation of parawepyia is not less unequivocal. 
Philostorgius!*, also, draws from his own experience for an 
illustration of ματαιοσπουδία, which is used of idle, trivial oc- 
- cupation'+, 

We have, thus, a record of a wzde-felt disapproval of a 
wide-spread ματαιοπονία! In the light of the evidence furnished 
by xevoorovdia, the development is strongly suggested of an 
atmosphere of idleness and of inactivity, or one of labor and 
zeal that were trivial and therefore condemned. ‘The words 
of Plutarch!® are, perhaps, significant in this connection: 
καὶ μόλις ἂν viv ὅλη [EAAds] παράσχοι τρισχιλίους ὁπλίτας, ὅσους ἡ 
Μεγαρέων μία πόλις ἐξέπεμψεν εἰς Πλαταιέψς .  , περὶ τὸ Πτῷον ὅπου 
μέθ᾽ ἡμέρας ἐντυχεῖν ἔστιν ἀνθρώπῳ νέμοντι, Evidence of the same 
weariness appear in the language of Strabo'® who writes of 
Athens that her navy was “‘almost extinct, that little re- 
mained of her Long Walls, and of the lower city no more 
than a small part of the maritime quarter”. Thebes was 
hardly deserving of the name of village, and the same was 
true of all the Boeotian towns except Tanagra and Thespiae. 
Dion’* gives a more picturesque description of Thebes when 
he says that “‘only a single statue stood erect among the 
ruins of the ancient market-place”. Pausanias!* in the 
second century, is our best witness of “shrunken or ruined 
cities, deserted villages, roofless temples, shrines without 
images and pedestals without statues, faint vestiges of places 


12. Epiph. i. 417 A. 

13. Philostorg. H. Ἐν. 11.1. 

14, Ματαιοσπουδία is found in Suicer, with this comment: οὐδὲν 
ὀνείρων διαλλάττουσιν αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ματαιοσπουδίαι͵ Eustathius (543) 
uses ματαιοπραγία of the idle, lazy, useless exertion of Homeric heroes. 
Of the numerous ματαιο- compounds, some are, of course, earlier, some 
later, in origin; paraodoyéw,—like μωρολογία, μικρολογία, φλυαρία and 
λαλέω and KevoAoyia—belongs to the older literature. We have chosen 
and treated ματαιοπονία, because of its close relation with κενοσπουδία͵ 
Ματαιοτεχνώ. is also interesting and is defined by Quintilian (2.20.3) as 
“supervacua artis imitatio, quae nihil sane neque boni neque mali 
habeat, sed vanum laborem’’. 

15. Plut. ii. 414 A. 

16. Strabo. ix. 1 and 2. 

17. Dion. Chr. vii. Or. p. 136. Dind. 

18. Frazer: Pausanias. p. xiv. Intr. (with ref’s) vol. i. 


53 


that once had a name and played a part in history”. It is 
well-known that through imperial favor Greece enjoyed, for 
two centuries, a high degree of tranquillity and of repose; 
this but encouraged her own settled calm, her state of leth- 
argy and of exhaustion. When men are strong and are 
vitally engaged in their own occupations, which are all- 
absorbing, then pataorovia and κενοσπουδία are foreign to their 
lives; the temper of this age, however, of Plutarch’s age 
was not far removed from— ματαιότης ματαιοτήτων͵ εἶπεν ὃ 
ἐκκλησιαστής, ματαιότης ματαιοτήτων, TA πάντα ματαιότης", 


Μισαδελφία. 


This is a term we do not find in literature before Diony- 
sius of Halicarnassus. Dionysius of Halicarnassus!, who 
calls the Roman character μισοπόνηρα and αὐθάδη, represents 
Horatius reviling his sister with the epithets ψευδοπάρθενε and 
purdderde, ‘The Greek’s knowledge of the evil of μισαδελφία 
is evidenced no less than his belief that the evil was a 
universal one in time and place. Plutarch’s? sweeping 
denunciation of μισαδελφία grew out of the bitterness of his 
conviction that φιλαδελφία was as rare in his day as μισαδελφία 
had been in the time of the ancients; in his own day, if we 
can believe his words, it was a common social evil which he 
deeply deplored. Philo® recognizes the presence of the 
μισάδελφος and of the picdvOpwros,—whose evil influences he 
seeks to overcome. The exhortations of the ecclesiastics* 
not to honor μισαδελφία before φιλαδελφία, to oppose φιλονεικία, to 
avoid envy and μισαδελφία, to seek goodness, love and peace 
are clear enough condemnation of a social evil whose effects 
they knew from experience and dreaded accordingly. 

From Dionysius of Halicarnassus, then, through at least 
the fourth century A. D., we find testimony to the existence 
of this evil, which meets with a bitter condemnation?. 


Dion. H. i. 464.9. 

Plut. ii. 478C., ii. 4826. 

Philo. i. 671.47. ; 

Patriarch. 1145 B; Athan. i. 305 B; Basil. ii. 820 B. 

We cannot believe that the idea of μισαδελφία is an entirely new 
one, bern at this late period of Greek ethics; μισάνθρωπος is a partial 


ἘΝ ck 2 de ee 


54 


Plutarch’s extreme, pessimistic view must be taken “‘cum 
grano salis”; his argument for the very great prevalence® of 
μισαδελφία in his own day and a corresponding rarity of 
φιλαδελφώ is invalid; as the same argument could be adduced 
to prove the contrary. And, in fact, the essay ‘De Fraterno 
Amore” is more evidence, perhaps, to the contrary of 
Plutarch’s statement than his argument is proof for the 
affirmative. "There can be.no doubting the fact, however, 
that the evil, whether wide-spread or no, affected the mind 
of the age with a certain horror, if Plutarch be a true repre- 
sentative. ‘he appearance of the term, if it was coined at 
this time, is evidence, probably, not so much of the preva- 
lence of the evil which is deprecated, as of a deeper moral 
consciousness and an acuter sense of sin! 

With a growing “humility” and ‘‘forbearance”, both 
earlier in time than μισαδελφία, such an attitude is easily com- 
prehensible. Further, the weakness, suggested by μετριοπάθεια 
and ἀνεξικακία, would break down the hostility necessary for ἃ 
prolonged μισαδελφία, The religious character of κοινωφελία͵ 
the generosity of 4éyaPoroia—would also contribute to the 
charity that opposed pwabeAdia?, Under such circumstances, 
the evil of μισαδελφία could hardly thrive, while the feeling 
against it would naturally be very strong. 


Κοσμοπολίτης͵ 


Though the term κοσμοπολίτης seems to be quite late in Greek liter- 
ature, the conception of world-citizenship had presented itself, long be- 
fore the first century A. D., to the mind of the Stoics and of the Cynics 
(Diog. L. 6.63. Lucian i. 548). ‘The idea was present to the imagination 
of the first century and, as Philo (Philo. i.1.18; i.657.6; ii.106,2. Moses 


expression of the same feeling and is as old as Demosthenes and Plato. 
It isa matter or some surprise that the word μισαδελφία, was not cre- 
ated earlier, as was its opposite φιλαδελφία, There are many late μισο-, 
μισα- compounds. The /eeling entertained toward μισαδελφία in the 
first century A. D. is, however, of more importance than the problem of 
the exact time, of the creation of this term! 

6. The moralist’s expression is, rather, merely one of protest than 
an accurate index of the extent of the evil; cf., for another exaggera- 
tion, Plut. ii. 1066 A. 

7. Perhaps, such late terms, as φιλαλληλία, ἀδελφότης, φιλευσέβεια͵ 
φιλοσυμπαθής and φιλοσυνήθης are significant, in this connection. 


55 


is Philo’s example of such lofty citizenship.) understood the character, 
the κοσμοπολίτης was a citizen of the universe, subject to the law of the 
whole κόσμος or to the regulations of Nature. Further, the soul that was 
κοσμοπολῖτις͵ Was also θεοφιλής and consecrated itself to the service of 
God, not enrolled in any one city, but through divine interest, possess- 
ing the whole world. In the social fabric of the first century, the con- 
cept was quite as natural to Greek as to Hebrew. For both,—the idea 
had a religious as well as a political significance, and Epictetus (Epict. 
2.10.3.), though using the different phrase πολίτης κόσμου, further illus- 
trates the moral obligations of world-citizenship (The /ew passages 
cited, in which this word occurs, do not militate against the belief in a 
wide currency of this term,~a belief resting upon the frequent repetition 
of the word in inscriptions; the same is true of μεγαλωφελής, ). 

While the fact of the κοσμοπολίτης͵ —of the man who ignored the 
barriers of race and of religion, of the citizen of the world who recog- 
nized a universal divinity and a universal philanthropy—is plainly 
established, his re/igious character is as much emphasized as his ethical 
or his political. 

The way was doubtless, in part at least, prepared for such a char- 
acter by the humanizing influences of such virtues as ταπεινοφροσύνη, 
μετριοπάθεια͵ ἀνεξικακία, ἀγαθοποιΐα͵ and κοινωφελία: the hostility enter- 
tained toward μισαδελφία, likewise was favorable toward a universal 
friendship; the leveling tendency of these habits of thought broke 
down narrow, local prejudices and made for the cosmopolitanism, 
represented by ὃ κοσμοπολίτης. 


Ἠθοποιΐα. 


While ἠθοποιΐα, with a moral suggestion, was not unknown 
to Aristotle’ ἃ ?, while to rhetoricians after Callistratus 
ἠθοποιΐα was well-known as a rhetorical term, in the first 
century A. D. the word acquired a deep ethical significance 
of genuine value! ‘The positive moral signification that the 
word then carries points, perhaps, to a deeper interest in the 
moral activity that the term defines! 

Plutarch’s well-known moral purpose, both in the “‘Mor- 
alia” and in the ‘‘Lives’’®, lends special interest to his frequent 
use* of the term ἠθοποιίΐα,͵, His discriminating use of ἠθοποιΐα 


1. Arist. rd, i. 955a 32. This case in Aristotle seems to be unique. 

2. Another passage, Rh. iii. 7., illustrates a step in the formation 
of the term, ἐὰν τὰ ὀνόματα οἰκεῖα λέγῃ TH ee, ποιήσει τὸ ἦθος, 

3. Plut. Pericl. 2. 

4, Plut. i. 71 B; i. 961 D; ii. 814 A; ii. 660 B; ii. 799 B; i. 153 B; i 
112 B; ii. 1053 D; ii. 450 F; 1.53 A. 


56 


i.e., in associating it with peace, bravery and justice in the 
case of the Romans, and with σωφρονίζειν and with noble 
pleasures in the case of the earlier Greeks suggest elements 
of his own moral ideal. Plutarch allows a wide range of 
ἠθοποιΐα͵ applying it to Spartans, to Sicilian Greeks and to his 
own times, socially and politically. "There is no question of 
his own concern for philanthropy and for a “‘formation of 
character” which shall be secure! Philo®, in the interests 
of an actual ἠθοποιΐα, declares the possibility of its realization 
through religion and through philosophy. In the absence of 
an exacter definition of the ἦθος, we can only conclude 
the presence of a desire for a noble ‘“‘character formation”. 
Strabo®, in a dissertation on the humanizing results of 
Roman conquest, counts ἡθοποιΐα among the signs of civiliza- 
tion. ᾿θοποιΐα might, of course, according to the significa- 
tion of the 700s, have a bad sense,—as when referring to the 
ἀγωγὴν τῶν παρὰ τοῖς κιναίδοις διαλέκτων καὶ τῆς ἠθοποιΐας. in Ionia. 
The stricter moral sense, with an exhortation to practice, 
recurs in Clemens’ of Alexandria: πρακτικός δὲ ὧν 6 παιδαγωγός͵ 
πρότερον μὲν εἰς διάθεσιν ἠθοποιΐας προὐτρέψατο͵ ἤδη δὲ καὶ εἰς THY τῶν 
δεόντων ἐνέργειαν παρακαλεῖί, Sextus Empiricus® controverts the 
belief of the Pythagoreans in an harmonious organization 
of the universe and the consequent value to be attached to 
ἠθοποιοῖς μέλεσι͵ 

᾿Ηθοποιίαϑ is also used in a different sense, of ‘‘delineation 
of character”, by sophists and by rhetoricians from Calli- 
stratus to Longinus,—by Callistratus!®, of the τέχνη with 
which the Argo was built, by Dionysius'! of Halicarnassus 
of Lysias and of Isocrates to whom he grants the most con- 
spicuous ἀρετή in composition, ἠθοποιΐα: this receives a defini- 
tion in the following: ἠθοποιεῖ καὶ κατασκευάζει τὰ πρόσωπα τῷ λόγῳ 
πιστὰ καὶ χρηστὰ προαιρέσεις τε αὐτοῖς ἀστείας ὑποτιθείς , 


ΩΝ ; 


5. Philo. i. 355.10; i. 302.41; i. 364.26; ii. 214.48. 

6. Strabo. 648 C (14.1.41); 127 C. (2.5.26). 

7. Clem. Al. i. 249C. 

8. Sext. Emp. M. 6.30; 6.36. 

9, Similarly, ἠθογράφος͵ ἠθολογία͵ 

10. Callistr. Stat. 10. 
11. Dion. H. de Lys. c. 8.c. 19. Isocr. c. 11. (for dvnBoroinros, Lys. 


57 


λόγονς ἐπιεικεῖς ἀποδιδούς καὶ ταῖς τύχαις ἀκόλουθα φρονοῦντας εἰσάγων: 
Hermogenes!? defined ἠθοποιΐα as μίμησις ἤθους ὑποκειμένου προσώπον͵ 
and classified it with other technical rhetorical terms, as 
προσωποποιΐα and «idwAoroia; Longinus!*® includes it among 
προδιόρθωσις͵ ἐπιδιόρθωσις, ἀποσιώπησις͵ παράλειψις, εἰρωνεία, In other 
words, ἠθοποιΐα is purely a technical term of rhetoric, with no 
further moral signification; as a rhetorical term it was widely 
known and we also find it in Aphthonius'*, Nikolaiis, Phoe- 
bammon, Zonaeus; Eustathius'®, commenting on Homer, 
Says: 9 τοῦ ᾿Ατρείδου ψυχὴ καὶ φησὶν ἡ θοποιητικῶς͵ 

While neither the Greek, the Hebraic, the Roman nor 
the Christian ideal has been exactly defined, above, the word 
is a symbol of an effort to attain a realization of those 
ideals! Widely'® used, the word reveals a genuine desire to 
promote ‘“‘character-formation”, to upbuild nobility of 
character. 

It were natural to conclude that ἠθοποιία meant, for the 
Greek of the first century A. D., a realization, in ‘“character- 
formation”, of elements that appealed to the age. “HOomoiia 
represents a conscious union of various ethical forces, repre- 
sented by ταπεινοφροσύνη, μετριοπάθεια,͵ ἀνεξικακία͵ ἀγαθοποιΐα, Koww- 
φελία, μεγαλωφελία, μεγαλοεργία͵ πειθήνιος, φιλαδελφία, κοσμοπολίτης --- 
which, all, separately, factors in the ideal character of the 
age, became united in the perfect ἠθοποιΐα͵ 


12. Hermog. Prog. 44. 

13. Longin. Frag. 8.14; (for ἀνηθοποίητος͵ 34.3). 

14. Cf. Rhetores Graeci, L. Spengel. 

15. Eust. 1955.54 and 49. 

16. ἀνηθοποίητος occurs in Cic. ad Att. 10.10.5, meaning ‘‘immoral’’. 


58 


LIST OF WORDS. 


PAGE 
Καινολογία : : ; ᾿ ᾿ 19 
Εὕρεσιλογα ; , ‘ 20 
Ταπεινός p ‘ 5 : ; 22 
Ταπεινοφροσύνη é : ἢ 26 
Μετριοπάθεια ; : ; 29 
᾿Ανεξικακία : } 5 : : 32 
᾿Αγαθοποιΐα ; ; ; ; ; 36 
Κοινωφελία and Μεγαλωφελής . 38 
Μεγαλοεργὰα ; ‘ i 41 
Κενοδοξία : : β ; F 43 
Περιαυτολογία . ; ; ᾿ 46 
Πειθήνιος ; ; : i 48 
Kevooroviia 4 ; ᾿ ἶ 48 
Ματαιοπονᾷ ΄͵ : ; ‘ 51 
Μισαδελφία . : ἷ - , 54 
KooporoAirns ; R : : 55 
"HOorovia ᾿ ; : ‘ : 56 


CONCLUSIONS. 


In the previous discussion it has been shown that all of 
these words are expressions, concrete symbols of real facts in 
the Greek life of the first century A. D. The ethical move- 
ments that these words evidence were genuine factors in the 
life of the age that Plutarch represents. There wkere 
certain virtues in process of development, that were encour- 
aged,—some of them more fully realized, others less so; 
there were certain vices whose existence was deplored and 
condemned. 

The words themselves are partial evidence of the ethical 
situation, inasmuch as we can be certain that they were 
vital, (compare Chapter on ‘“‘Method”, also xavodoyia and 
εὑρεσιλογία): their acceptance in the language, their long 
history shows them to be precipitates of genuine thinking 
and feeling of serious import. ‘The extent of that ethical 
vocabulary, (which goes back in its beginning at least to the 
time of Polybius, and which developed in the time of 
Plutarch and includes both new ideas and old ones reinforced 
or altered), is further evidence of the width and depth of 
the moral agitation of the first century A. ἢ. ‘The ideas 
and conduct these words portray were determinative, and 
quite full testimony of such conduct is received from the lit- 
erature before and after Plutarch’s time representing actual 
conditions in life, as well as ideals?. . 

The moral ideal of Plutarch is our immediate concern, 
but while we can establish certain data of his ethical stan- 
dard, some of these data appear to be true for the whole 
century as well, as we find the same attitude observed in 
further literary and other sources of the same time as that 
of the great representative Boeotian; this attitude, develop- 


1. Itis thought that a complete study of the history of the entire 
ethical vocabulary found in Plutarch must make quite clear the nature 
of the moral ideal of the Greeks of the first century A. D., which is by 
no means as yet fully understood. 


60 


ing before, finally became established in the first century A. 
D. and continued long after, not only in time but also in 
place’. 

That moral agitation, which was undoubtedly sincere 
and deep rooted, is, in part at least, defined by the study we 
have made of a portion of the ethical terminology, which is 
no less a positive record of moral progress than the marbles 
of a fallen temple are witness of an ancient glory’. 
Plutarch’s ethical ideal included the virtues of ταπεινοφροσύνη, 
μετριοπάθεια, ἀνεξικακία, ἀγαθοποιΐα, κοινωφελία, μεγαλωφελής, φιλαδελφώ͵ 
κοσμοπολίτης and combated the evils of κενοδοξία, περιαυτολογία, 
'κενοσπουδία͵ ματαιοπονία. the ethical movement had a definite 
relation to the past but was also firmly established in the new 
conditions of the later age. Ταπεινοφροσύνη he received with 
great reserve, owing to an inherited strain of Greek pride; 
μετριοπάθεια was strongly exhorted; while in a way recalling 
the past, and even applied to Socrates, it was essentially a 
new virtue that implied much weakness; ἀνεξικακία is distinctly 
a new product that brought in its train opposition to τιμωρία, 
kindness toward slaves, toward the feeble, and toward a foe, 
that encouraged ἀοργησία and φιλανθρωπία. ἀγαθοποιΐα had a clear 
religious implication and κοινωφελία, quite a new term, was in 
time predicated of God as well as of man; Plutarch cherished 
this idea as he did that of μεγαλωφελής: curiously enough we 
find the latter term applied to God, nature, and heroes of the 
past, rather than to men of the present,—which is also true 
peyadoepyia, Plutarch sincerely regretted the μισαδελφία that 
existed in his own day, and was deeply affected by the evils 
of κενοδοξία, which he associated with covetousness, jealousy 
and flattery; no less bitterly did he condemn the περιαυτολογία 
of his own day, while the prevalent κενοσπουδία was actually 
responsible for a large degree of melancholy; ματαιοπονία was 
another fault of the age that disturbed the moralist; many 
of these faults were inherent in the Greek nature, but the 
practical philosophy of Plutarch contemplated their reform; 


2. The ‘‘discussion’’ gives this information with such exactness as 
may be attained in this matter. 

3. It should be borne in mind that this study is merely a ‘‘prolego- 
mena” and that more evidence will be published at a later time. 


61 


the idea of πειθήνιος seems to have been complex, as the whole 
system of ethics was, which referred its laws now to man, 
now to God; now to human institutions, now to divine power. 
The ideal of character formation, ἠθοποιΐία, included, besides 
the above,—peace, bravery, justice, σωφροσύνη and noble 
pleasures. The entire group of words and concepts repre- 
sents a deep moral earnestness, a positive longing for virtue 
and hatred of sin. 

The ideas that we have, in large measure, been consider- 
ing, separately, were also very closely inter-related. While 
suggestions have already been made of this correlation, it 
may be well, in conclusion, to pass all of the ideas in review, 
together. . 

As has already been established, the moral ideal was not 
merely a vision hovering before the mind of the age, but cer- 
tain virtues, crystallizing, had penetrated the very heart of 
the Greek life and found a home there. ‘The general ten- 
dency was toward a generous interpretation of life and of 
its obligations. A gradual appreciation of humility, (ταπει- 
νοφροσύνη) the foundation-stone of this ethical structure, 
induced a mode of thought and a habit of feeling, favorable 
to a broad philanthropy, which, in private affairs, fostered 
an ideal of brotherly love (φιλαδελφία), and, in public matters, 
cherished the hope of world-citizenship (κοσμοπολίτης), when, 
reversing the old process, the individual sought the state. 
A new interpretation of control of the passions (μετριοπάθεια) 
was a resultant psychological necessity, and a noble forbear- 
ance (ἀνεξικακία) became a psychological possibility; the 
feebleness of these qualities undermined the aristocratic 
sense of pride, once an essential quality of Greek ethics. 
Advancing hand in hand, these democratic virtues proceeded 
to put into action (ἀγαθοποιΐα, μεγαλωφελής) their ideals but 
lacked the strength to initiate the universal amelioration 
(κοινωφελία) which should have been the logical issue of such 
effort. With a great capacity for sacrifice, this nature was 
smitten with a sad feebleness that made its inherited strain 
of pride a mockery and its.chief ambition, a failure. 

While sympathy was cosmopolitan and ethics received 
her law from religion, (cf. πειθήνιος, xowwderia, ἀγαθοποιΐα, dvegi- 
κακία) there were, however, other forces present which checked 


62 


and complicated the onward movement of thought. Obedi- 
ence {πειθήνιος) did not yield unquestioningly to the dictates 
of humility, but reserved for herself a large measure of free- 
dom, by which the natural tendency and the final results of 
the ideas, previously considered, were necessarily held in 
abeyance. Frivolity and conceit (κενοδοξία) were native 
elements, sot easily eradicated from the Greek character, 
though bitterly condemned by the age; humility won only a 
partial triumph over this foe. ‘The representative voice of 
the age, to be sure, raised a protest against anger (ὀργή), but 
Plutarch, himself, was, as yet, still unable to extend an 
unreserved welcome to humility (ταπεινός), While there may 
have been a gain in generosity, that sentiment was still con- 
fined within serious limitations. 

The evident earnestness of the moral movement had also 
to contend against a deep-seated languor, frivolous zeal, idle 
indifference (xevoorovdia, paraomovia), ‘Though the Greek con- 
science was disturbed by these and regret was profound, the 
disease was not readily cured; and the Greek’s boastfulness 
(περιαυτολογία), his ostentation and his egoism were a hollow 
pretence that left him in his weakness, melancholy and 
resigned. 

In the midst of these contradictions, in the strife, on the 
one hand, between a noble generosity and an effort to be 
great through being good, and, on the other, a pride that 
was self-centered rather than altruistic,—in the conflict 
between sincerity and pretence, we see an unceasing yearning 
for the Golden Fleece of a Moral Ideal! ‘There is no doubt- 
ing the fact that there was a wide-spread belief in virtuous 
ideals and encouragement of virtuous acts! Τὸ condemna- 
tion the age passed upon its own weaknesses, the regret it 
felt at its own failures bespeak the earnestness to attain the 
goal of noble living. Aware of the presence of evil in his 
own nature which a conscientious introspection had revealed 
to him, the Greek’s conscience was deeply stirred and he was 
impelled to purify his own heart. Incapable, perhaps, of 
inaugurating a universal reform, though not abandoning the 
the hope of it, the purity of the individual was his immedi- 
ate aim! Thus, though the period was one of contradictions 
and of compromises, though paradoxes blocked progress, 


63 


public opinion seems to have taken a definite trend in ἃ cer- 
tain direction. With whatever longing the Greek may have ~ 
reverted to the great days of long ago, (meyaAvepyia, μεγαλωφελής) 
and whatever self-esteem (περιαυτολογία) he may have jealously 
cherished because of his past, the present need was inculcat- 
ing new lessons of moral reform and the national ‘“‘Geist” was 
being transformed. ‘The Greek was no longer the Greek of 
old, with an aesthetic consecration to beauty but a new type 
of Greek, with a deep conviction of duty*. 

What the results to Greek ethics would have beeen, in 
the first century, had Greece been left alone to work out her 
own salvation without the intervention of Roman dominance, 
is a matter of fascinating, though idle speculation, (Polyb. 
xl. 5.12). Certain it is, however, that the Roman was quite 
unconscious of those hidden forces that were silently sway- 
ing the Greek multitude and making for noble character 
(ἠθοποιΐα), in spite of the external decadence! (cf. hist. 
introd.) ‘That there was no great resultant organized social 
reform is a sad commentary on the weaknesses of an age, 
incapable of putting into complete effect, its own highest 
ideals. (Plin. Ep. x. 93. 94.) Historians of Greece, reflect- 
ing upon the political, economic, and social decline of the 
country, have failed to appreciate fully, the substratum of 
genuine worth in the Greek character, at this period! 
Although the moral ideal may not have gained universal 
validity, it had, nevertheless, strongly impressed itself upon 
the mind of the age, and a correct understanding of the 
period must recognize this fact as well as weigh the external 
events of history. In the gloaming of Greek political and 
economic life, when there was little of energetic activity 
(κενοδοξία, κενοσπουδία͵ ματαιοπονία) and as little energetic think- 
ing, there was, nevertheless, a deep undercurrent of reflec- 


4. The original contact with Rome may, perhaps, have stimulated 
the evolution of this sense; at any rate a moral atmosphere was develop- 
ing not merely about Plutarch but throughout the Greek world; the 
political, economic, and social decline that was accompanied with great 
disasters was, perhaps, also ultimately responsible for this reaction. 
Principles of human conduct, seemingly fundamental, were undergoing 
slow and subtle alterations, the cumulative affect of which meant in 
time a complete transformation. wen 


64 


tion, that dwelt upon the broad sympathy of ἀγαθοποιΐα and 
the cosmopolitan philanthropy of κοινωφελία, the majesty of a 
past μεγαλοεργία and the possibility of a present μεγαλωφελίας 
that resented the pretensions of the Romans, with scorn, 
(mepuvrodoyia, κενοδοξία), that went in imagination far beyond 
the limitations of municipal administration, granted by 
Roman authority®, to ideas of universal citizenship (κοσμοπο- 
λίτης), that deemed ταπεινοφροσύνη, μετριοπάθεια͵ ἀνεξικακία worthy 
of sincere consideration and which ended in resignation and 
sadness (peyadoepyia, Kevoorovdia, pucadeApia), ‘The results of 
Roman administration upon Greek character were both good 
and bad, but albeit this external influence was great, the 
internal evolution, whether because of it or in spite of it, 
was advancing toward lofty ideals of righteousness®. 
Roman love of conquest was, in Greek ethics, represented by 
a sense of sacrifice (ἀνεξικακία, μετριοπάθεια), Roman habit of 
self-indulgence was here balanced by a recognition of 
altruism (κοινωφελία), Roman pride was here met by a Greek 
ideal of humility (ταπεινοφροσύνη) ! 

It is not strange that the ethics of this period were 
eclectic in character; we find the artistic and the humanistic, 
~the national and the cosmopolitan, the social and the indi- 
vidualistic, the objective and the subjective all contributing 
to this system of ethics; man hardly knew which claim was 
paramount and whether salvation was attainable through 
holiness or through wisdom, or through both! ‘The ethical 
ideal was subject to theological, rational, natural, individual 


5. A quasi-political renaissance, though the conquest of Greece 
was never more complete. 

6. While the Greek’s own great deeds were a thing of the past, 
while sorrow, the greatest leveler of all, colored his entire attitude 
toward life, despair did not yet seize upon him, for he felt that 
(μεγαλωφελής,͵, peyadoepyia, κοινωφελής, ayaboroita) . Nature and God, 
at least, were great and good and that in Reason, he possessed the 
Ariadne—thread to lead him out of the labyrinth to his own ideals of 
the Conscience! The elements in his nature alien to his moral ideal, 
though they possessed all the force of inherited traits and of tradition, 
were opposed by a profound devotion to duty, by a sense of goodness, 
purity and holiness. A sense of sin conspired with a love of God to 
establish a moral ideal that had a religious sanction (ἀνεξικακία, xoww- 
φελής,͵ μεγαλωφελής) and a rational basis (κενοσπουδία͵ meOnvos) ! 


65 


and universal impulses, in the midst of which there existed, 
with divided authority, a hierarchy of faith and a sover- 
eignty of reason,—a necessary moment in Greek Being, 
(cf, ἀγαθοποιία͵ ᾿κοινωφελής, κενοσπουδία) prior to a greater evolu- 
tion. New ideas were born into the world, meeting with 
deep appreciation, but there was a sad lack of Titanic 
emotions capable of welding, with gigantic force, the various 
elements into an organic synthesis (ἠθοποιΐα), The age 
produced no inspired prophet with power to command; there 
was only a Chaeronean high-priest, to aspire! 


66 


Page 7. 


ςς 


10. 


ERRATA. 


For Keyon, read Kenyon. 


Add Demosthenes to list of orators; for D. E. 
Holmes, read D. H. Holmes; for Hyperdis, read 
Hyperidis. 

For Y. P. Boissevain, read V. P. 

Read Αθησαυριστων, instead of ‘‘ A@noavpictwv”’; 
Sylloge, instead of “‘Sylogge”; A. N. Janaris 
instead of ‘‘A. A. Jangaris”. ἼΤΩ 


Note 4. For ‘‘Inser’, read Inscr. 
For Note 4, read 14. 
(line 12). For “‘till not”, read not till. 


Note 6. (line 6). Note following corrections: 
ἀλλοτριοπραγία, οἰνόληπτος οἰκοδέσποινα, συνανασώζω, 
ἐκπαθής͵ 

Read associated instead of ‘“‘associately”’. (0. v4) 


(line 16). Read καθόλου δὲ τοὺς ταῖς εὑρησιλογίαις 
κατασοφιζομένους͵ 


νι 


Note 10. (line 2). Read 1251 b. 15, 25. 


(line 26). Read affect, instead of “‘effect’”; Note 
13, read Matth., instead of Math. 


Note 2. Read μετριότης, instead of μετριόπης, 


2: 
(line 87). Read μεγαλοφροσύνη, instead of méyado- 
φροσύνη. 
(line 26). Read boastfulness; (line 28), σεμνολογέω, 
instead of σεμνογογέω, 


(line 10). Read ἐπαχθές-. (line 18), δέ, instead of δὲ, 
(line 19), read περιϊσταμένου, instead of περιΐσταμενον: 
(line 38), read becomes, instead of ‘“become’’. 


(line 30). Read Εἴδωλ᾽ instead of dwn’, 


(line 17). Read ‘‘T‘he sadness”; Note 1. Read 
-πόνημα, instead of -πὸόνημα, 


(line 31). Read φαντάσματα, instead of φαυτάρματα, 


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